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Abstract
We address some of the challenges in achieving internet voting for real world elections.
One challenge is that home-based computers are likely to be infected by malware, threat-
ening both the integrity and privacy of the vote. Another concern is the possibility that
a voter may be coerced to vote in a particular way, for example by a family member or
organised crime ring. Moreover, any voting system intended to be used on a large scale
should not require complex operations by voters whose purpose is hard to understand.
We introduce a series of novel proposals for internet voting, presented across three
parts. First we examine how the problem of malware-infected computers in internet voting
could be solved. We propose to use a dedicated hardware token (which is not required to
be trustworthy) that helps remove the need to trust the voting computer and the server.
Second we examine how the outcome verification methods provided by internet voting
can be made more intuitive. We show how using trial votes help voters achieve more
intuitive verifiability.
Third we examine how the tension between verifiability and incoercibility can be
reconciled while maintaining the usability of the voting systems. We propose a new
property which we call “coercion-evidence” that helps improve usability, reduce trust
assumptions, while maintaining the security of the system.
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CHAPTER 1
Introductory remarks
1
2 Introductory remarks
The elections play a very important role in any democratic entity and, therefore, it is
crucial to conduct elections in a trustworthy manner. In the traditional voting systems
most of the trust lies in the hands of few people who are responsible for counting the
ballots. This single point of trust could become vulnerable to corruption, and attacks
on the integrity of the system – bribing the people who are responsible for counting the
votes can change the entire outcome of the elections. The governments around the world
have also been investing in technologies that could be used to run elections in a secure
manner. For example, using computers for voting and counting in the elections could help
as computers can’t be bribed, and in case of any issues these computers can be audited
and actual problem could be detected. Moreover, this opens the scope for internet voting
which along with better accuracy has the potential to increase voter participation. In a
survey, 60.6% of people overall said they are more likely to vote if they could vote over
the internet, and 81.7% of the 18-35 year age group [Nat14].
For all its advantages, however, internet voting is very challenging to secure [KSRW04,
CFH+07, BCE+07, CS11, WWH+10, KTV12, WWIH12]. In contrast with internet bank-
ing and social networking, it is not easy to put mistakes right if they are uncovered after
the results of the election have been declared. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to prove
that the software that might be running on a voter’s computer or on the server has the
expected properties. Nonetheless, internet voting systems are being deployed for national
elections [HLW11, Gjø11] and organizational elections [dMPQ09, Uni15, BVQ10, HBH10].
This deployment has been enabled, in part, by improvements in cryptographic protocols
that ensure ballot privacy as well as verifiability of the election outcome, even when the
authorities and servers running the election cannot be trusted. The rise of the concept of
election outcome verifiability or end-to-end verifiability has also helped in encouraging this
deployment – anyone can verify the results based on the inputs and outputs of the voting
system without relying on the software that is running behind the scenes. Moreover, it
is more practical to verify the results produced by the software, than the software itself.
Therefore, election outcome verifiability is sometimes referred to as software independence.
3To achieve election outcome verifiability encrypted data about the elections is posted on
a public bulletin board (for example, a website) in a way that anyone could verify the
correctness without revealing the actual votes.
To ensure free and fair elections, ballot secrecy is another vital aspect. A strong form
of ballot secrecy, which is known as incoercibility, ensures that voters cannot convince
anyone else about how they voted, with high probability. This prevents them from selling
their vote, or being coerced i.e. forced to chose a particular candidate. Coercion is not
an issue in traditional voting methods, because the polling booth provides a completely
private place where a voter cannot be influenced by the coercer at the time of voting.
In Internet voting, coercion could take many forms – voters could be coerced by a fam-
ily member, an employer or by organized criminals. To avoid coercion and to achieve
verifiability at the same time, strong cryptography is used, which ends up making these
systems difficult to use by voters. This becomes even more difficult in the presence of a
malicious computer. A specially-produced malware could affect the vote at the time it is
cast on a voter’s home computer. Therefore, a very careful approach needs to be taken
for making internet voting systems verifiable while preserving privacy. This motivated
us to find techniques to make internet voting more trustworthy by reconciling verifiabil-
ity and privacy while keeping usability and the problem of malicious computers in our mind.
Real world implementations: Some countries are already using internet voting for
legally binding elections. In Estonia, it was first used in 2005 for local elections and in 2007
for parliamentary elections [HLW11]. Voters use Estonian ID cards for authentication,
which is a mandatory national identity document. The Estonian system uses procedural
controls to ensure transparency and to guard against attacks. However, Springall et al.
have shown that those procedures are insufficient and have recommended Estonia to
discontinue use of their current internet voting system [SFD+14].
Norway also carried out internet voting pilot projects during the parliamentary elections
in 2011 and 2013 [Gjø11, AHL+09]. These were later discontinued as it didn’t improve
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voter turnout and due to the concerns that the voters have limited knowledge about the
security mechanisms in the system [Nor14].
Another system called Helios has been successfully used in elections where coercion
is not considered to be a serious concern. Université catholique de Louvain in Belgium
has used Helios for electing the university president in 2009 [dMPQ09]. The International
Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR) also ran mock elections using Helios in 2010
[BVQ10]. This system gives anyone the ability to audit elections. It takes reasonable steps
as well to preserve voter privacy.
Coercion and vote buying are among the problems in internet voting that are difficult
to avoid and therefore some electronic voting systems have been designed to be used in
polling stations. End-to-end verifiable voting systems like Scantegrity and Prêt à Voter are
used in controlled environments (polling stations); this enables them to give stronger
security guarantees compared to internet voting systems. Scantegrity II was successfully
used in municipal elections at Takoma Park [CCC+09, CCC+10]. The Victorian Electoral
Commission (VEC) in Australia used a system based on Prêt à Voter in Victoria’s state
election in 2014 [BCH+12].
1.1 Problem statement
Much work has been done in recent decades to make electronic voting a reality [Adi06,
Cla11, Ess12]. But the conflict in the properties that internet voting systems are expected
to achieve, has made it difficult to conduct internet voting for large scale elections. Many
of the complexities in internet voting schemes arise because of the tension between election
verifiability (“transparency”) and voter privacy (“opacity”). The existing systems that
achieve both of these properties are complex to use by the voters and therefore can’t be
deployed for legally binding election in the near future. The verifiability property in such
systems is usually achieved by using cryptographic proofs which are non-intuitive, and
unduly burden users to verify them [SLC+11]. Moreover, such systems typically assume
1.2 Thesis statement 5
the computers used by the voters to submit their votes are trusted for privacy [Adi08,
HLW11, Gjø11], or for both privacy and verifiability [JCJ05, CCM08]. Some estimates
are that 30–40% of home computers are infected, and one has to assume that determined
attackers could produce and distribute malware specifically designed to thwart a national
election [Sam12, Dan10]. It is crucial to find a trade-off between the security properties
which seem to be contradicting with usability properties.
1.2 Thesis statement
We briefly argued in the previous section that there is a tension between election verifiabil-
ity and stronger forms of voter privacy. An important question therefore is whether this
tension could be mitigated while maintaining usability.
Thesis Statement: We aim to demonstrate that the conflicting properties of verifiability
and privacy can be reconciled for internet voting while maintaining the usability of the
systems, even in the presence of untrusted platforms.
Objective and Scope: The objective of this thesis is to present techniques to balance
verifiability and privacy for future deployable internet voting systems. We also aim to
reduce trust in the computers used by voters during the election. In particular, we will
propose solutions to meet these three objectives:
• Objective 1: Improve verifiability and privacy in the presence of untrus-
ted computers. Provide solutions to improve verifiability when the computers
used during the election might be untrusted, while preserving voter privacy.
• Objective 2: Improve individual verifiability for voters. Propose techniques
to make individual verifiability more intuitive for voters without increasing complexity
on the voter’s side.
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• Objective 3: Improve usability by relaxing coercion-resistance. Propose
techniques to relax coercion-resistance while maintaining same level of incoercibility,
to improve usability for voters.
Ideally we would like to achieve above mentioned objectives in a single voting system.
However, it is not possible at the moment under reasonable trust assumptions and, therefore,
more research is needed. The independent contributions presented in this thesis will let
election administrators pick and choose the properties they want. This will help in the
future to design internet voting systems that closely match the requirements of the users.
1.3 Overview of this thesis
An overview of this thesis is outlined below.
• Chapter 2: Preliminaries and related work
In this chapter, we describe the desired properties for internet voting systems. We
recall the cryptographic primitives (the basic building blocks) that are used in this
thesis. We present previous work that is related to this thesis. This chapter also
presents a detailed overview of the internet voting system JCJ/Civitas, which is
required to understand work presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
• Chapter 3: Du-Vote: Internet voting with untrusted computers
In Chapter 3 we present the design of Du-Vote; an internet voting protocol that
eliminates the often-required assumption that voters trust general-purpose computers.
Trust is distributed in Du-Vote between a simple hardware token issued to the voter,
the voter’s computer, and a server run by election authorities. Verifiability is
guaranteed with high probability even if all these machines are controlled by the
adversary, and privacy is guaranteed as long as at least either the voter’s computer,
or the server and the hardware token, are not controlled by the adversary. A new
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is employed to verify the server’s computations.
1.3 Overview of this thesis 7
Du-Vote is a step towards tackling the problem of internet voting on user machines
that are likely to have malware. We anticipate that the methods of Du-Vote can be
used in other applications to find ways of securely using platforms that are known
or suspected to have malware.
• Chapter 4: Trivitas: Voters directly verifying votes
Individual verifiability is the ability of an electronic voting system to convince a
voter that her vote has been correctly counted in the tally. Unfortunately, in most
electronic voting systems the proofs for individual verifiability are non-intuitive
and, moreover, need trusted computers to check these proofs. Based on the remote
voting system JCJ/Civitas, in this chapter we propose Trivitas, a protocol that
demonstrates an intuitive way of achieving individual verifiability, while at the same
time preventing coercion.
The technical contributions of this chapter rely on two main ideas, both related to
the notion of credentials already present in JCJ/Civitas. Firstly, we propose the use
of trial credentials, as a way to track and audit the handling of a ballot from one
end of the election system where a voter submits her vote, to the other end where
all the votes are counted, without increased complexity on the voter end. Secondly,
due to indistinguishability of credentials from random values, we observe that the
association between any credential and its corresponding vote can be made public
at the end of the election process. We also observe that this doesn’t make voters
vulnerable to coercion. This way, the voter has more intuitive and direct evidence
that her intended vote has not been changed and will be counted in the final tally.
• Chapter 5: Caveat Coercitor: Coercion evidence in electronic voting
The balance between the requirement of election verifiability, coercion-resistance:
inability of a coercer to coerce voters, and usability remains unresolved in internet
voting despite significant research over the last few years. In this chapter, we propose
a change of perspective, replacing the requirement of coercion-resistance with a new
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requirement of coercion-evidence: there should be public evidence of the amount of
coercion that has taken place during a particular execution of the voting system.
We provide a formal definition of coercion-evidence that has two parts. Firstly, there
should be a coercion-evidence test that can be performed against the bulletin board
to accurately determine the degree of coercion that has taken place in any given run.
Secondly, we require coercer independence, that is the ability of the voter to follow
the protocol without being detected by the coercer.
To show how coercion-evidence can be achieved, we propose an internet voting
scheme, Caveat Coercitor, and we prove that it satisfies coercion-evidence. Moreover,
we argue that Caveat Coercitor makes weaker trust assumptions than other remote
voting systems, such as JCJ/Civitas and Helios, and at the same time has better
usability properties.
• Chapter 6: Discussion, further work, and conclusion
We discuss what we have achieved with respect to the objectives of this thesis,
present possible further research work and open questions that have emerged, and
offer some concluding remarks.
1.3.1 Publications
In this section we provide a list of publications that were generated during work on this
thesis. This thesis contains, and must be considered, the definitive reference of details and
ideas, presented in these publications.
• Conference
1. Gurchetan S. Grewal, Mark D. Ryan, Liqun Chen, and Michael R. Clarkson.
Du-Vote: Remote electronic voting with untrusted computers. In Proceedings of
the 28th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2015, Verona,
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2.1 Desired properties
In this section, we briefly describe the properties that electronic voting systems are expected
to satisfy. We first discuss the core requirements of verifiability and privacy, then we go
on to briefly explain two other desirable properties: fairness and usability. For the core
requirements we will discuss various sub-requirements as well.
2.1.1 Verifiability
Verifiability is an integrity property. It assures the voters that their votes are recorded in
the system and the election outcome is computed correctly. Any attempt to corrupt the
integrity of the elections must be detected. Election verifiability in presence of a bulletin
board may be conveniently split in three notions [KRS10]:
• Individual verifiability: To any voter, individual verifiability should offer the
possibility to verify that her cast ballot has been correctly recorded and tallied by
the system [Cha04, Nef04, AN06]. Ideally, the voter should also have an assurance
that her cast ballot correctly encodes her cast vote. In some systems this additional
assurance is offered by an option to audit a ballot [Ben06, Ben07, Adi08] or a ballot
form [CRS05] before casting a vote.
• Universal verifiability: To any external observer, universal verifiability should
offer the possibility to verify that all recorded votes have been correctly tallied
[JJR02, Nef01, FS01, HS00].
• Eligibility verifiability: To any external observer, eligibility verifiability should
offer the possibility to verify that the set of tallied votes corresponds to votes cast
by eligible voters [JCJ05, CCM08, KRS10]. Eligibility may be enforced at any stage
in the system: either during the casting of a vote [CRS05], or during its recording
[Adi08], or during its tallying [JCJ05, CCM08].
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2.1.2 Privacy
Privacy is a confidentiality property. It assures the voter that no one can learn the link
between her identity and her vote. It can be divided into three types based on the strength
of privacy:
• Ballot secrecy: To any voter, ballot secrecy guarantees, with a high probability,
that the way she voted is not revealed to anyone by the voting system. This property
assures that the link between a voter and her vote remains secret [KR05, DKR06,
DKR09]. For instance, if Alice and Bob be two arbitrary honest voters voting yes
and no respectively, then even if they swap their votes an attacker cannot know how
they voted. This is the weakest privacy property as it assumes that the voter doesn’t
voluntarily reveal how she voted.
• Receipt-freeness: A voter after participating in an election is unable to later prove
to someone how she voted by revealing the information she obtains while interacting
with the voting system [BT94, Oka96, DKR06, MN06, DKR09]. In other words, a
voting system satisfies receipt-freeness if an attacker cannot distinguish with high
probability between a situation where a voter genuinely cooperates with him to cast
a vote to the attackers desired candidate and a situation where she pretends to
cooperate but casts a different vote, based on the information provided by the voter
and the voting system. This property is stronger than ballot secrecy as it doesn’t let
the voter later prove how she voted even if she is willing to do so.
• Coercion-resistance: A coercer interactively communicating with a voter to in-
struct her to vote in a certain way is unable to distinguish if the voter followed
her instructions or not, even if the voter is willing to cooperate [Oka97, DKR09,
JCJ05, DKR06]. More precisely, for any strategy available to the coercer there
exist a strategy for the voter that allows her to cast her intended vote while it
is indistingushable to the coercer with high probability from her casting a vote
according to the coercer’s intent. This is the strongest privacy property and it
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subsumes receipt-freeness and ballot secrecy.
As observed by authors in [Cla11, Ess12], receipt-freeness was proposed mainly in
the literature in the context of polling station voting, whereas coercion-resistance
was proposed for internet voting. The primary difference is that an attacker has
more capability in coercion-resistance as compared to receipt-freeness [DKR09]. In
coercion-resistance voter gives any information that she gets during the voting process
to the attacker and use information that the attacker provides to her. Whereas
in receipt-freeness the attacker just receives information from the voter and any
publicly available information. A comprehensive analysis of various ballot privacy
definitions is presented in [BCG+15].
2.1.3 Other properties
Along with the above properties, some other properties are also important:
• Fairness: No early results can be obtained which could influence the remaining
voters. The voting system should not favour any candidate in any way.
• Usability: The voting system should be easy to understand and use by the voters.
All these properties should be satisfiable even in the presence of the corrupt election
authorities.
2.2 Cryptographic primitives
In this section, we briefly outline some of the main cryptographic primitives that will
be used in this thesis. These cryptographic primitives are the basic building blocks for
electronic voting protocols, and these are standard among the electronic voting literature.
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Notations for encryption, and security assumption: Encryption of a message m
with a public key y using randomness r is denoted enc(m; y; r). We omit y when it is clear
from context. And when the particular random value r is not relevant, we omit it. For
simplification, we also sometimes write encryption of m as em. Decryption of a ciphertext
c with a private key z is denoted dec(c; z). We omit z when it is clear from context.
Throughout this thesis, we assume that the encryption enc is perfect: given a ciphertext
enc(m; y; r), the plaintext m can only be recovered by the holder of the corresponding
private key z (we assume the random r has been discarded with the encryption).
Distributed ElGamal: The encryption scheme being used is the ElGamal encryption
scheme [Gam84, Gam85] and we will make use of distributed decryption [DF89, BCGG99,
Ped91b, Bra05]. It works over a multiplicative group of integers modulo a prime p = 2kq+1,
where q is also prime. The plaintext space and the ciphertext spaceM is of the order q
subgroup of Z∗p. Each party involved in the decryption process has a private key, which is
a number zj ∈ Z∗q and a corresponding share of the public key yj, where yj = gzj mod p.
The product
∏
j yj of all the public keys can itself be used as a public key, denoted y. The
encryption of a message m with a public key y i.e. enc(m; y; r) is a pair (gr mod p,m · yr
mod p) where r is a fresh random number in Z∗q. Decryption of a ciphertext encrypted
under y requires participation of all the tellers, each using their own private key. To
decrypt a ciphertext (a, b) each party publishes a partial decryption share ai = azi mod p
using their private key zi. The final decryption can then be publicly computed as ba1···an
mod p (where n is the number of distributed parties). The scheme works over a cyclic
group G with generator g.
Exponential ElGamal: We also consider an exponential version of ElGamal encryption,
in which during encryption the plaintext message is also used as an exponent of the
group generator [CGS97]. The encryption of a message m with a public key y is a pair
(gr mod p, gm · yr mod p) where r is a random number. In Chapter 3, we use a variant
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of exponential ElGamal in which another group generator h is raised to the power of
the plaintext message. Exponential encryption of message m with public key y using
randomness r is denoted enc-exp(m; y; r), where enc-exp(m; y; r) = (gr, hmyr). Sometimes
we omit parameters to enc-exp, as with enc. The security of the scheme relies on the
standard assumption that it is computationally infeasible to determine logg h—that is, the
discrete logarithm relationship between g and h [Ped91a].1
The exponential ElGamal encryption scheme satisfies the homomorphic property. Let
a ciphertext encrypting a plaintext m under the public key y be C = (C1, C2) = (gr, hmyr).
Given two ciphertexts Cˆ = (Cˆ1, Cˆ2) = (grˆ, hmˆyrˆ) and C¯ = (C¯1, C¯2) = (gr¯, hm¯yr¯), a new
ciphertext, written as C˜ = (C˜1, C˜2) = (gr˜, hm˜yr˜), can be created by computing C˜1 = Cˆ1C¯1
and C˜2 = Cˆ2C¯2, where r˜ = rˆ + r¯ and m˜ = mˆ + m¯. Therefore, enc-exp(m1; y; r2) ·
enc-exp(m2; y; r2) = enc-exp(m1 +m2; y; r1 + r2).This homomorphic property is commonly
called the additive homomorphic property. The homomorphic property of the ElGamal
scheme is used to reencrypt a ciphertext (or encrypted vote) in order to hide the plaintext
(or vote) from its original encryptor in order to guarantee the public verification.
Re-encryption and mix nets: Given a ciphertext enc(m; y; r) constructed using the
public key y any party can compute another ciphertext enc(m; y; r + r′) that encrypts the
same plaintext using the same key y, by using a new random r′ [PIK93, Cha03, JJR02].
We will denote the re-encryption of a ciphertext enc(m; y; r) (having plaintext message
m) with a given random r′ by renc(m; y; r′). We omit y when it is clear from context.
Re-encryption is sometimes also referred to in the literature as Re-randomization.
A re-encryption mix net is a set of agents Mix that takes as input a sequence of
ciphertexts S = m1, . . . ,mk and outputs a sequence of ciphertexts S ′ = m′1, . . . ,m′k that
is a re-encryption mix of S. Specifically, S ′ is a formed by re-encryption of elements in
1One way to realize this assumption is based on a Schnorr group. Let p and q be large prime numbers,
such that p = `q + 1 for some `. Define Schnorr group G to be an order-q subgroup of Z∗p. To construct g
and h from G, first choose any two bit strings a and b, such that a 6= b. Then let g = (hash(a) mod p)`
and h = (hash(b) mod p)`. Check that g 6= 1 and g 6= −1, and likewise for h. Also check that g 6= h. If
any checks fail (which happens with low probability), then try again with some other values for a and b.
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a permutation of S: there is a permutation σ of {1, . . . , k} and a sequence of randoms
r1, . . . , rk such that m′1 = renc(mσ(1); r1), . . . ,m′k = renc(mσ(k); rk). Moreover, if at least
one element of Mix is not controlled by an adversary C, the permutation σ remains secret
to C.
Plaintext equivalence test: Given two ciphertexts enc(m1; y; r1) and enc(m2; y; r2),
encrypted with the same key y, whose plaintexts are m1 and m2 respectively, a plaintext
equivalence test (pet) allows the holders of the decryption key to demonstrate thatm1 = m2,
without revealing the decryption key or any information about m1 or m2 [JJ00]. Consider
two ElGamal ciphertext pairs (a1, b1) and (a2, b2), roughly, holders of the decryption key
compute (a, b) = (a1
a2
, b1
b2
) and perform a distributed decryption of (a, b); if the result of the
decryption is 1, then the encrypted messages are equal, otherwise they are not equal.
For two ciphertexts c1 and c2, we will denote by pet(c1, c2) = ok iff the plaintext
equivalence test holds for c1 and c2. Key holders only provide pets as indicated by the
protocol.
Zero-knowledge proofs: A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a proof between a prover
and a verifier that demonstrates to the verifier that a certain statement is true, without
revealing any information except the validity of the statement [GMR89]. Non-interactive
zero knowledge proofs (NIZKP) are a variant of ZKP that do not require interaction
between the prover and the verifier. If the statement being proved asserts that the prover
knows a secret signing key, this type of NIZKP can be a signature on some arbitrary value
using the signing key, and is called a signature-based proof of knowledge (SPK). A Schnorr
signature [Sch91] is commonly used for this purpose.
Decryption, re-encryption mixnets and plaintext equivalence tests can be accompanied
by non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that attest of the fact that these operations have
been correctly performed, without revealing sensitive information like the decryption key.
Zero-knowledge proofs are crucial in order to ensure universal verifiability of the election,
18 Preliminaries and related work
while preserving user privacy. We will denote by petproof(c1, c2, res) a zero-knowledge
proof that the result of the plaintext equivalence test applied to c1 and c2 is res.
Ring signatures and OR-proofs: Consider a set {P1, . . . , Pn} of participants, and
suppose that each participant Pi has a private key ski and a corresponding public key pki.
We suppose Pi possesses his own private key ski and all of the public keys {pkj}1≤j≤n. A
ring signature is a cryptographic signature that such a participant Pi can make, and has
the property that any verifier in possession of the public keys {pkj}1≤j≤n can be assured
that one of the participants {P1, . . . , Pn} made the signature, without being able to tell
which one it was [AOS02, CLMS08]. In a ring signature, there is one “actual” signer, in our
example Pi; the signing process uses his secret key ski and the public keys {pkj}1≤j≤n, j 6=i
of the other ring members. The actual signer does not need the permission or involvement
of the other ring members.
If the statement being proved asserts that the prover knows a secret value satisfying a
disjunction of properties, then a ring signature can be used. For example, given a finite set
Ω = {x1, . . . , xn}, a group generator g, and a function f , we may prove in zero knowledge
that we know a d such that gd = f(x1) or . . . or gd = f(xn). Such a proof is a ring
signature on an arbitrary value, where the actual signing key is d and the public keys are
{f(x) | x ∈ Ω}. We write such a signature proof of knowledge as
SPK{d | ∃x : x ∈ Ω ∧ gd = f(x)}.
It is useful to generalise this to a double signature. Let Ω be a set of pairs, and g1, g2 be
two group generators, and f1, f2 be two functions. We write
SPK{d | ∃x1, x2 : (x1, x2) ∈ Ω ∧ gd1 = f1(x1) ∧ gd2 = f2(x2)}
to mean a proof of knowledge of d satisfying gd1 = f1(x1) and gd2 = f2(x2) for some (x1, x2) ∈
Ω. The signer’s private key is d, and the ring of public key pairs is {(f1(x1), f2(x2) |
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(x1, x2) ∈ Ω}.
A signature-based proof of knowledge and OR-proof are also used as zero-knowledge
proofs. Indeed, we use them in Chapter 3.
2.3 Related work
In recent years we have seen technology help people become more involved in debate about
all aspects of society. So it seems that technology can play a much greater role in political
participation as well. With this hope a lot of work on electronic voting has been done
in past 30 years. In this section we will briefly describe some of those systems that are
relevant to our research. We will mainly focus on some internet voting protocols that: (1)
provide verifiability of elections, (2) make efforts to resist coercion, or (3) allow voting to
be conducted on an untrustworthy platform.
2.3.1 Coercion-resistance
Coercion-resistance is a fundamental, and strong, property of internet voting systems. It
states that a voter should be able to cast her vote as intended, even in presence of a coercer
that may try to force her to cast a different vote. A formal definition of coercion-resistance
based on observational equivalence is proposed in [DKR09]. They prove that the Lee
protocol [LBD+03] satisfies it. Another definition based on observational equivalence is
proposed in [BHM08], where an automated proof with ProVerif has been carried out for
JCJ/Civitas.
2.3.1.1 JCJ/Civitas
Juels et al. [JCJ05] proposed the first internet voting system that achieves coercion-
resistance and verifiability. It was implemented by Clarkson et al. as Civitas [CCM08].
We refer to these systems as JCJ/Civitas. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this thesis are
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closely related to JCJ/Civitas, therefore we describe it in detail here.
The main idea in JCJ/Civitas is the notion of credentials (with a private and a public
part), that allow eligible voters to authenticate their ballots. To allow coercion-resistance,
JCJ/Civitas distributes credential generation among a set of parties called registrars. To
resist coercion, the voter has the ability to generate a fake credential and fake proof, that
is indistinguishable from the real credential and real proof for the coercer.
The participants of the protocol are
R - the set of registrars, whose role is to authenticate eligible voters and help generate
their credentials.
T - the set of tellers, whose role is to generate and publish the public key of the election.
Each of them holds a secret share of the corresponding private key, that will be used
for distributed decryption and plaintext equivalence tests.
V1, . . . , Vn - the set of eligible voters.
P - voting platform/computer used by a voter.
Mix - a re-encryption mix net, whose role is to anonymize the set of cast ballots before
verification of their eligibility and their decryption.
BB - the bulletin board, whose role is to record the manipulation of ballots at all stages
of the election, from the voting phase to the tallying phase. It is a repository of the
information collected throughout the election and this information is made publicly
available for anyone to inspect [CS14]. It also records proofs of correct ballot handling
submitted by R, T and Mix, that can be checked by external auditors.
Trust assumptions: A coercer may control some of V1, . . . , Vn, some of R, some of T and
some of Mix but not all. For a voter Vi to achieve coercion-resistance, at least one Vj,
j 6= i, one of R, one of T and one of Mix, and the voting platform P must be outside
the control of the coercer. Moreover, there must be an untappable channel from Vi to
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the trusted registrar, so that the coercer can not get hold of the real credential, and an
anonymous channel for the voter to submit the ballot. The voter must also trust the
voting platform to correctly construct the voting ballot and to verify the zero-knowledge
proofs provided by registrars. A summary of the protocol is as follows:
Initialisation: The election starts with tellers T generating the public key pkT of the
election in a distributed manner, such that no minority of tellers can recover the private
key skT [Ped91a] and the decryption is distributed [Bra05] as discussed in section 2.2. The
public part of the key is published on the bulletin board.
Voting credentials: In order to cast their vote, every eligible voter needs credentials. Each
credential has two parts: public and private. The voter receives private part of the
credentials from the registrars which is explained in the registration phase. Public part
of the credentials is the encryption of the private part with some random and public key
pkT of the tellers T . Each private credential can have more than one public credentials.
Private credentials will be denoted by the letter s (decorated with various indices). For
a given private credential s, there exists a corresponding public credential enc(s; pkT ; r),
which will be published on the electoral roll. We sometimes denote public credentials (and
their re-encryptions) by the letter es (decorated with indices).
Registration: By running a separate protocol with each of the registrars, the voter V
obtains a private share siV of her voting credential. Let m = |R|. The private voting
credential of the voter is the sum of all private credential shares, i.e. sV = s1V + . . .+ smV ,
and the public credential is the homomorphic combination of all public credential shares re-
gistered on the electoral roll, i.e. enc(sV ; pkT ; r) = enc(s1V ; pkT ; r1)∗ . . .∗enc(smV ; pkT ; rm) =
enc(s1V + . . .+ s
m
V ; pkT ; r1 + . . .+ rm).
Validity of voter credentials: Each registrar also provides the voter with a non-transferable
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proof (designated-verifier re-encryption proof) PQ of the fact that the public share
enc(siV ; pkT ; ri), that is published on the electoral roll ER, correctly encodes the private
part siV [HS00]. The proof can be verified on the voting platform of the voter.
Resisting coercion: The voter has the ability to construct a fake credential by replacing
the credential share siV of a trusted registrar with a fake credential share s′
i
V . The voter
also has the ability (with the help of the voting platform) to construct a fake proof P′Q
that causes enc(siV ; pkT ; ri) to appear as an encryption of s′
i
V .
Voting: The ballot (enc(sV ; pkT ; rs), enc(ν; pkT ; rν),Psν ,Pcorr), from the voter V , contains
the encryption of the private credential sV (with the key pkT and with a different random
than in the electoral roll) and the encryption of the intended vote ν (with the key pkT ).
To prevent the re-use of the same credential by a party that does not hold the private
part, the ballot contains additionally a zero-knowledge proof Psν of the fact that its
creator knows both sV and ν. Additionally, a zero-knowledge proof Pcorr proves that
ν is a valid vote, according to the specification decided by election authorities. The
ballot (enc(sV ; pkT ; rs), enc(ν; pkT ; rv),Psν ,Pcorr) is constructed by the voting platform and
submitted to the bulletin board. All such ballots are added to the set of cast ballots that
we call as BBcast.
Verification of proofs and mixing: Before tabulation starts, the zero-knowledge proofs
Psν and Pcorr of cast ballots, present in the set BBcast, are verified (e.g. by the tellers) and
ballots with invalid proofs are discarded. The set of cast ballots with valid zero-knowledge
proofs of correctness are stored in the set BBvalid. The valid ballots (without the proofs)
and the credentials from the electoral roll are then sent to the re-encryption mix net
Mix for anonymization. The mixed ballots are recorded in the set BBmix, and the mixed
encrypted electoral roll as the set BBaer.
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Tallying: Credentials from anonymized ballots (i.e. from the set BBmix) are compared,
using plaintext equivalence tests (pet), to credentials from the anonymized electoral roll
(BBaer), to ensure that votes to be counted are cast by eligible voters only. If multiple
ballots are submitted with the same credentials, only one copy is kept according to a
predefined policy, e.g. only the last vote counts. Duplicate elimination is done by plaintext
equivalence tests and can be performed either before, or after the mix. Finally, the decided
set of countable votes is decrypted.
The re-encryption mix, the plaintext equivalence tests, and the decrypted votes are
accompanied by zero-knowledge proofs that ensure the operations have been correctly
performed.
2.3.1.2 JCJ/Civitas variants
Several attempts have been made to improve various aspects of JCJ/Civitas. To solve the
problem of quadratic complexity of JCJ/Civitas, Smith [Smi05] and Weber et al. [WAB07]
proposed systems to linearise the complexity. However, it was later shown that those
systems do not satisfy coercion-resistance [AFT07, AFT10]. More systems were purposed
after that to successfully achieve coercion-resistance in linear-time [AFT07, AFT10, AT13,
SHKS11, SKHS11, SHD10]. Clark and Hengartner proposed a system to simplify aspects
related to usability and coercion resistance [CH11]. Our work proposed in Chapter 4
simplifies aspect related to verifiability, and Chapter 5 improves usability by weakening
coercion-resistance [BGR11, GRBR13].
2.3.2 Voting on an untrusted platform
As we argued in the previous sections, verifiability and privacy are two fundamental
properties of electronic voting protocols. What is more, these properties need to be
ensured even in the presence of an untrusted platform, that may tamper with or coerce the
voter’s choice at any moment between voting and vote counting. Therefore, an ongoing
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thread of research over the last few years has been in minimizing or removing the trust
assumption that the voters need to make about their voting platform. In this section we
briefly describe some of the system that completely or partially deal with the untrusted
platform problem. Our work in Chapter 3 also propose solutions to deal with the untrusted
platform problem.
SureVote [Cha01] was the first system to propose solutions for an untrusted platform. It
avoids the assumption of a trusted platform, by bypassing to use the voter’s computer
except as an untrusted communication channel. In SureVote, voters receive a code sheet
(shown in Figure 2.1) through a trusted channel, such as physical mail. The voter cast her
vote by logging into the untrusted computer, and entering the Ballot ID and the Vote code
of the preferred candidate. The server verifies the Ballot ID and based on the submitted
vode code sends back the acknowledgement code. As the computer is used only to send
and receive codes from the sheet, it does not learn the link between the candidate and the
submitted code. Due to the insufficient knowledge about the codes on the code sheet, the
untrusted platform can’t change the codes. SureVote ensures privacy with respect to the
untrusted computer, but voters cannot verify the construction of code sheets. Moreover,
by using the code sheet and the acknowledgement code received back from the server,
voters can prove how they voted in the elections.
Candidate Vote Code Ack Code
Alice 3857 8372
Bob 4753 7730
Charlie 9109 2515
Dave 7635 1456
Ballot ID: JS5Ah6VEV7Y2I7
Figure 2.1: An example code sheet received by a voter in SureVote.
Pretty Good Democracy (PGD) [RT09] improves SureVote by using an end-to-end
backend to ensure stronger integrity properties. In PGD, the acknowledgement mechanism
is distributed among several trusted tellers at the server end, thereby ensuring greater
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guarantees that if the user receives the correct acknowledgement code then the correct
vote is logged. The voters in PGD submit an encryption of their preferred candidate’s
vote code. The tellers perform plaintext equivalence tests (pet) of the encrypted code with
their own data to find the acknowledgement code. In PGD, a single acknowledgement
code is located to each code sheet as shown in Figure 2.2. This makes PGD receipt-free,
in the sense that the voter cannot prove to a coercer after the event how she cast her vote.
Candidate Vote Code
Alice 3857
Bob 4753
Charlie 9109
Dave 7635
Ack Code: 9876
Ballot ID: DS5Ah6VEC7Y2I3
Figure 2.2: An example PGD code sheet.
JCJ/Civitas [CCM08, JCJ05] discussed in detail in Section 2.3.1.1, provides coercion-
resistance but requires voters to trust their computers for both integrity and privacy.
Neumann et al. [NFVK13, NV12] extend Civitas with a smart card to manage voter
credentials [CCM08]; that scheme does not protect the voter’s privacy from an untrusted
platform. For integrity, trust has been moved from the untrusted platform to the smart
card and cut-and-choose technique is used to assure integrity of ballot construction.
Haenni and Koenig [HK13] propose a trusted device for voting over the internet on
an untrusted platform. In their system, the platform generates encryptions in the form
of barcodes, the voter makes her selection on the dedicated trusted hardware device by
scanning chosen candidate’s barcode. The voter’s chosen vote is later transferred to a
trusted computer using a smart card or a USB connector. The device requires a camera,
matrix barcode reader, and uplink to a computer. Moreover, the hardware device learns
voter’s vote.
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Remotegrity [ZCC+13] extends the Scantegrity II [CCC+09] paper-ballot voting system
to use for remote voting. In Remotegrity, a voter receives a paper ballot and an author-
ization card by mail. Part of the ballot is printed with invisible ink, and parts of the
authorization card are covered with scratch-off coating. A voter marks the ballot with a
special pen, revealing a previously invisible code for a candidate. She then scratches off a
field on the card, revealing a previously hidden authentication code. As part of the voting
protocol, she submits both the candidate and authentication code to a bulletin board.
Remotegrity assumes a secure means of distributing the ballots and authorization cards.
Helios [Adi08, dMPQ09] uses a cast-xor-audit [Ben06, Ben07] technique (also know as
cut and choose) to assure integrity of ballot construction. A voter can either cast her ballot
or audit it. Auditing challenges the computer to prove it acted honestly in encrypting
her candidate choice. But to verify that proof, the voter must seek out a trustworthy
computer. The voter’s computer automatically learns how the voter voted, thus violating
privacy.
Helios is designed for low-coercion elections. It makes a few efforts to resist potential
coercion, for example by keeping secret from voters the randoms in their ballots, but these
efforts are easily defeated. On the positive side, Helios 2.0 enjoys individual and universal
verifiability (but not eligibility verifiability). The most interesting feature of Helios is its
high usability, which has been demonstrated by running large elections without failure.
2.3.3 Other related systems
We discussed remote voting systems in the previous section. In this section we describe Prêt
à Voter, a polling station voting system that is designed to provide end-to-end verifiability
and transparency while ensuring secrecy of the ballots.
Prêt à Voter [CRS05, RS06, RBH+09] is a paper ballot based polling station voting
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system which provides end-to-end verifiability to the voters and auditors. In this system,
the ballots, shown in Fig 2.3, are generated by the trusted authority before the start of
the elections. The ballot has two columns, left hand column contain the candidate names
and the right hand column for voter to mark her selection. The candidate names on the
left column are in a randomized order, the offset of this order is encrypted and written on
the bottom of the right hand column.
Candidate Tick box
Dave
Alice
Bob X
Charlie
ab34kq9c
Figure 2.3: An example ballot in Prêt à Voter.
To cast a vote, the voter ticks the box next to the candidate of her choice, and then
tears off the two columns and shreds the left hand column, which contains the list of
candidates. The right hand column is then scanned by an optical scanner. The voter
keeps this right hand column as a receipt and later compares it with the bulletin board
where the scanned copy should appear. The receipt assures the voter that her vote is
submitted as cast but it doesn’t reveal to anyone else how she voted. This scanned right
hand column is mixed by using mix nets and decrypted by tellers in a distributed manner.
Prêt à Voter also employs cast-xor-audit technique to let voters and observers verify
the correctness of generated ballots. The voters can ask to audit a ballot at the polling
station (which will annul their ballot) and then they can start the process to cast their
vote again.
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3.1 Introduction
Most of the existing internet voting protocols typically assume that the computer used
by the voter to submit her vote is trusted for privacy [Adi08, HLW11, Gjø11], or for both
privacy and verifiability [JCJ05, CCM08]. This assumption might seem necessary, because
humans cannot compute the encryptions and other cryptographic values necessary to run
such protocols. But the assumption is problematic, because a voter’s computer might well
be controlled by an attacker [ED10].
In this chapter, we introduce a new protocol Du-Vote (Devices that are Untrusted
used to Vote), that eliminates the need for voters to trust their computers. As depicted
in Figure 3.1, we propose the use of a simple hardware token (referred in this chapter as
H) such that a voter V interacts with her computing platform P and the hardware token
H to cast a vote on server S. The encryption of candidates take place on the computing
platform, and the voter’s choice of encrypted candidate is made with the hardware token,
such that neither the platform nor the hardware token learns the voter’s plaintext choice.
The server verifies that the computing platform is behaving honestly and anyone (e.g.
observers and voters) can verify the computations done by the server, to check its honesty.
Moreover, Du-Vote requires very little functionality from the hardware token. It needs
only
• to accept short inputs (e.g., twenty decimal digits) and produce very short outputs
(e.g., four decimal digits),
• to store a secret value, similar to a cryptographic key, that can be pre-installed
before delivery to the voter, and
• to compute modular exponentiations and multiplications.
The hardware token H does not need any connection to another computer, so there are no
requirements for a general-purpose operating system, drivers, etc. Indeed, Du-Vote requires
H to be unable to communicate with anyone other than the voter. The only means for
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Server S 
Token H 
Voter V Platform P 
Figure 3.1: Du-Vote architecture.
H to communicate with the outside world should be by using a built-in keyboard and
screen. H can even be software closed, such that its software cannot be modified. These
requirements can be satisfied by hardware tokens similar to those shown in Figure 3.2,
which are used by e.g. banks for two-factor authentication. Such tokens have a decimal
keypad, an LCD screen that can display a few digits, and a command button that causes
the device to compute an output.
Because of its simple design, the trustworthiness of H could be established through
verification and/or testing. In fact, given a trustworthy H, Du-Vote does not need to make
any assumptions about the computing platform P , either for privacy or for integrity. Our
security analysis (in Section 3.4) shows that, when H is trustworthy, Du-Vote guarantees
verifiability of the election outcome and of individual votes even if both P and S are
controlled by the adversary. Du-Vote guarantees privacy of votes if at least one of P and S
is not controlled by the adversary. So one contribution of Du-Vote is the relocation of trust
from a large computational device (the voter’s general-purpose computer) into a small
computational device (a token). Although other systems (including SureVote [Cha01],
Pretty Good Democracy [RT09], and Helios [Adi08]—all discussed in Section 3.6) have
similarly worked to relocate trust, Du-Vote is the first to ensure both privacy and verifiability
with a trusted computing base that consists only of a hardware token like that used in
real-world banking applications.
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Figure 3.2: Hardware tokens used in banking. These devices store secret information into
a tamper-resistant hardware. One on the left, has device with screen and keyboard; on
the right, a device with screen and just one key.
Du-Vote offers substantial protection of integrity and privacy even if the manufacture
of the hardware token H is controlled by the adversary. Surprisingly, verifiability of the
vote is assured with high probability even if all the machines involved (H, P , and S) for a
given voter V are controlled by the adversary (Section 3.4). Privacy is guaranteed if either
P , or H and S, are not controlled by the adversary. Another contribution of Du-Vote is,
therefore, a voting system that achieves verifiability and privacy without requiring trust in
the computers used by voters. The assumptions we make to achieve privacy are justifiable
because voters who are technically competent can protect their privacy by making sure
that their own computer (P ) is free from any election related malware. The voters who
don’t trust their computers can rely on trustworthiness of devices (H and S) provided by
the election authorities.
The verifiability in Du-Vote involves a novel non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that
enables the server S to prove that it correctly selects and re-encrypts the ciphertext chosen
by the voter, without revealing it.
Du-Vote is the front end of a voting system: it is designed to collect votes and post
them on a bulletin board. The back end used to tally the bulletin board is modular; it
could be instantiated with verifiable reencryption mixnets [Cha03, JJR02] or verifiable
homomorphic tallying [CGS97, dMPQ09].
Our main contributions: 1) We introduce Du-Vote, a new voting system that addresses
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the problem of voting using untrusted voting machines and untrusted servers. Du-Vote is
the first voting system to ensure both privacy and verifiability with a TCB that consists
only of a hardware token like that used in real-world banking applications. 2) We show
that even if this TCB is in fact untrusted (Section 3.4.1.2), it is practically impossible for
it to change some voters’ votes without detection.
We proceed as follows. Section 3.2 introduces Du-Vote from the perspective of a voter.
Section 3.3 presents the design of the Du-Vote voting scheme. Section 3.4 analyses the
security of Du-Vote, including what happens when various components turn out to be
malicious. Section 3.5 discusses different aspects of Du-Vote and possible improvements.
Section 3.6 compares Du-Vote with related work, and section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Voter experience
We begin by describing Du-Vote from the voter’s point of view. No cryptography is in-
volved in this description, in part to illustrate that the voter experience is straightforward.
Section 3.3 details all the cryptographic protocols.
Registration: Each voter registers to vote with the authority running the election. This
registration may occur online. The voter establishes a username and password for server
S to cast her vote. The authority issues a hardware token to all voters, either in person or
by postal mail (perhaps in tamper-evident envelopes to reduce the chances of disruption
of elections by a delivery service).
Voting: Using her computing platform P , voter authenticates to server S using her voter
ID and password.1. The platform displays a code page to voter, as shown in Figure 3.32
The instructions in Figure 3.4 are conveyed to the voter by the computing platform.
1Neither privacy not integrity of the election depend on the security of the password. It is present only
to prevent data disruption that could anyway be detected in the verification stage.
2Du-Vote’s code pages appear superficially similar to Chaum’s code sheets [Cha01]. But Du-Vote
constructs and uses code pages in a different way, as we describe in Section 3.3.
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Candidate Column A Column B
Alice 3837 7970
Bob 6877 2230
Charlie 5525 1415
Dave 9144 2356
Enter your vote code here
Ballot ID: JSAhVEVYIFRTLXByb2dyYW
Figure 3.3: An example code page as displayed by P .
These instructions are also widely publicised—for example, in newspapers, TV channels,
and online media—so that they are common knowledge among voters. Following them,
the voter enters five codes into her hardware token, obtains a new vote code from the
hardware token, and enters that vote code into the computing platform. Then the voter
records her ballot ID and vote code.
Please follow these instructions to cast your vote:
• Check that your computer has displayed the candidates in alphabetical order and has displayed two codes (in
column A and B) for each candidate.
• Flip a coin.
• If the coin landed heads:
– Enter all the codes, from top to bottom, from column A into your token.
– Find the code for the candidate for whom you wish to vote in column B. Enter that code into your
token.
• If the coin landed tails:
– Enter all the codes, from top to bottom, from column B into your token.
– Find the code for the candidate for whom you wish to vote in column A. Enter that code into your
token.
• You should now have entered a total of 20 digits into your token. Press the command button on your token.
Your token will display a new, four-digit vote code. Enter that vote code into your computer.
• Record your ballot id and vote code to later double-check that your vote was received.
Figure 3.4: Voting instructions, assuming n = κ = 4. The voter is in possession of a
hardware token similar to that of Figure 3.2 (left), and a computer P displaying a code
page similar to Figure 3.3 .
Auditing: A log of all the votes received by the server is made available for review by
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all voters. To double check that her vote was correctly received and recorded, V confirms
that her ballot ID and vote code are in that log.
The cryptography behind the curtain: Although voters don’t need to know this, the
codes on the code page are truncated probabilistic encryptions of candidate names—that
is, the last four digits of a decimal representation of a ciphertext. The computing platform
P computes those ciphertexts. That leads to three problems, all solved with the help of
the hardware token:
• The computing platform P might try to cheat in constructing the ciphertexts. So
voters are required to enter an entire, randomly chosen column to their hardware
tokens. The vote code output by the hardware token is based on that column. The
server uses the vote code to verify that the column was encrypted correctly.
• The computing platform might try to change the order of codes displayed to the
voter. So the vote code output by the hardware token is also based on the order in
which voter has seen codes in the audit column. This later informs server in what
order a voter saw the codes.
• The computing platform might try to learn the voter’s plaintext vote. Clearly, since
P knows the plaintexts, voter cannot reveal its chosen candidate code directly to P .
So voter makes her selection on her hardware token. The vote code output by the
hardware token is based on that selection. The server uses the vote code to recover
the voter’s encrypted candidate.
How the server uses the vote code to accomplish these tasks, and all the other cryptographic
details, we explain, next.
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3.3 Voting scheme
In addition to the principals already introduced (hardware token H, voter computing
platform P , and server S), Du-Vote uses a set T of decryption tellers, who are principals
entrusted with shares of the decryption key under which votes are encrypted. Du-Vote
also uses a bulletin board BB and a cryptographic hash function hash(·).
3.3.1 Setup
Du-Vote employs distributed ElGamal encryption and exponential ElGamal encryption
(as explained in Chapter 2 Section 2.2). Each decryption teller has a private key which is
a number zj ∈ Z∗q and a corresponding share of the public key yj, where yj = gzj . The
product
∏
j yj of all the public keys is used as a public key, denoted y. Decryption of a
ciphertext encrypted under y requires participation of all the tellers, each using their own
private key.
A variant of exponential ElGamal encryption is also used in Du-Vote. In this variant,
a group generator g is raised to the power of randomness r, and another group generator
h is raised to the power of the plaintext message. Recall that r is a fresh random number
in Z∗q.
3.3.2 Registration
The electoral roll of authorized voters is determined by the election authority in advance.
Each authorized voter V may register to establish a voter ID and password for server S.
Du-Vote does not require any particular protocol for this registration.
As part of registration, the election authority issues to each voter a hardware token.
Each hardware token is configured with its own, unique value K, where K = yk for a
randomly chosen k.1At the time H is issued to V , the authority causes server S to record
1Our notation is meant to suggest keys, and indeed k will be used in Section 3.3.6 to compute a value
that resembles an El Gamal encryption.
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an association between k and V . Note that S can, therefore, derive the K stored on V ’s
token. We assume that H is issued over a private channel (perhaps in person or through
postal mail in a tamper-evident envelope).
Given a sequence of decimal digits as input, H interprets that input as an integer d.
When the command button is pushed, H outputs (Khd mod p)∗, where h is another group
generator used in exponential ElGamal encryption and ∗ denotes a truncation operator that
produces short representations of large values, as follows. Let κ be a security parameter
of Du-Vote. Given a large value L, let L∗ denote the final κ digits of some canonical
representation of L as a decimal integer. Therefore (Khd)∗ denotes the final κ digits of
the decimal representation of Khd (we skip mod p as it is clear from the context). Here
are two other examples of how to form L∗:
• If L is a bit string, then convert that bit string to an integer and yield its final κ
decimal digits.
• If L is an ElGamal ciphertext (gr,myr), first represent (gr,myr) as a bit string
gr||myr, where || denotes concatenation, then proceed as in the previous example.
Denote the output (Khd)∗ of the hardware token on input d as H(d).
Typically, we assume κ = 4. More digits would require more typing into the hardware
token, affecting the usability of Du-Vote. Fewer digits would affect the security of Du-Vote
by reducing resistance to randomization attacks (discussed in Section 3.4.1.2, Remark 4) in
which hardware token could causes voter’s vote to change to an unpredictable candidate.
3.3.3 Opening of election
In advance of an election, the set Can of n candidate names {a1, . . . , an} is published on
BB. An algorithm for generating a publicly verifiable but unpredictable election nonce
I is also declared and published. This election nonce could be generated by using stock
market data [CCC+10, CEA07, CH10]. The election nonce must be generated after the
hardware tokens have been manufactured. It is critical for integrity that hardware tokens
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Candidate Column A Column B
a1 A
∗
1 B
∗
1
a2 A
∗
2 B
∗
2
a3 A
∗
3 B
∗
3
a4 A
∗
4 B
∗
4
Enter your vote code here
Ballot ID: hash(A,B)
Figure 3.5: The cryptographic construction of a code page. Each entry A∗i denotes the
truncation of an encryption Ai = enc-exp(ai) of candidate ai. Likewise, each B∗i is also
the truncation of an encryption Bi = enc-exp(ai) of ai. In the ballot ID, value A denotes
the lexicographically sorted sequence of ciphertexts A1, . . . , A4 in column A, and likewise
for B in column B.
are unable to learn the election nonce (that is why they have no input interface except the
short value keypad).
3.3.4 Voting: preparation of the vote by platform P
To vote, voter first authenticates to server through her computing platform using her voter
ID and her password. The platform retrieves candidate names Can and election nonce
from the bulletin board.
Second, P prepares a code page for the voter. The essential idea in preparing that
code page is that P creates two different encryptions of each candidate name. The two
encryptions will be used later to verify that P computed the candidate’s encryptions
honestly. The construction of a code page with four candidates is shown in Figure 3.5.
Each candidate’s name is encrypted once in column A, and again in column B. To defend
against an attack (cf. Section 3.4.1.2, Remark 5) in which a malicious H and P conspire
to violate integrity, those encryptions must be chosen by P in a specific way, detailed
below. This method is designed to prevent a dishonest P from having a covert channel
with which to communicate to a dishonest H.
• P computes a set {c1, . . . , c2n} of distinct decimal codes determined by I and voter
ID, each code having κ digits (recall that n is the number of candidates). To achieve
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H P S
Display
a1 A
∗
1
B∗
1
.
.
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.
.
.
.
an A
∗
n B
∗
n
Ballot ID
V types codes
Compute C∗
V types C∗
C∗
{A1, . . . , An}
{B1, . . . , Bn}
Produce re-encryption E
of chosen ballot, proofs
Px′ ||PD||PE ||PF and
Ballot ID
1
Figure 3.6: Du-Vote voting protocol. Platform P displays the candidates and the codes.
Token H computes vote code C∗ from the codes entered by the voter. The server S later
produces re-encryption E of the chosen candidate’s encryption and NIZKPs to prove its
honesty.
this, P generates a bit stream seeded by hash(I, voter ID) and repeatedly consumes
an appropriate number of bits from it to form each of the codes in turn. If any code
would be identical to a previous one, P discards it and produces a new one, until it
has the required 2n distinct codes.
• P chooses a random α such that 1 ≤ α ≤ n and cyclically assigns the subset
{c1, . . . , cn} of codes to candidates: cα to a1, cα+1 to a2, . . . , wrapping around and
assigning cα−1 to an. Let codeA(i) denote the code assigned to ai according to α.
• Likewise, P chooses a random β such that n+ 1 ≤ β ≤ 2n and assigns the subset
{cn+1, . . . , c2n} of codes to candidates: cβ to a1, cβ+1 to a2, . . . ; Let codeB(i) denote
the code assigned to ai according to β.
• For each candidate ai, platform P chooses a random r and computes enc-exp(ai; y; r+
j) for each j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} until the ciphertext Ai = enc-exp(ai; y; r + j), satisfies
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A∗i = codeA(i). 1
• Likewise, P finds ciphertexts Bi such that B∗i = codeB(i).
• P generates a code page as depicted in Figure 3.5. This code page also contains a
ballot ID where P commits to the ciphertexts. The ballot ID is defined as hash(A,B)
where A denotes the lexicographically sorted sequence of ciphertexts A1, . . . , An in
column A, and likewise for B in column B.
Third, P invites V to vote with the code page. To vote, V follows similar instructions as
in Figure 3.4. For example, if V ’s coin flip yields tails and V wants to vote for a candidate
whose ciphertext is x, then V enters B∗1 || . . . ||B∗nx∗ into H, where x∗ ∈ {A∗1, . . . , A∗n}, and
presses the command button. Let d be the decimal representation of what the voter enters.
In response to the command button, H calculates C = Khd mod p, and outputs vote code
C∗, which is the final four digits of C. The voter enters C∗ into P . Finally, P sends C∗,
along with {A∗1, . . . , A∗n} and {B∗1 , . . . , B∗n}, to S.
3.3.5 Voting: processing of the vote by server S
First, to verify P ’s honesty, S checks that P computed the codes in A and B correctly. To
do so, S computes bit string hash(I, voter ID) and—just as P should have—produces a
set {c1, . . . , c2n} of codes from it. Then S checks that A contains the first half of that set,
and B the second half (both in some cyclic order). S posts C∗, A, and B on BB. S also
generates ballot ID (just as P should have) and posts that on BB as well. This ballot ID
forces P to commit to the ciphertexts; it cannot later choose different ciphertexts (with
different plaintexts) that match the codes.
Second, S does a brute-force search to determine what code V entered as a candidate
choice. The input space for this search is the set of inputs V could have entered into H,
given that V ’s code page was constructed from A and B. Anyone who knows I and voter
1This is efficient, because if enc-exp(ai; y; r+ j) = (α, β) then enc-exp(ai; y; r+ j +1) can be computed
as (αg, βy). See section 3.5. Moreover, it is secure; we prove the security of this variant of Elgamal in
Appendix A.2.
3.3 Voting scheme 41
ID can compute those inputs. The size of the input space is 2n2: the full column entered
by the voter is 1 of 2 columns; the cyclic permutation of that column starts at 1 of n
candidates; and the candidate chosen by the voter is also 1 of n.
Computing the output of H, however, requires knowledge of value K stored in H.
Recall (from Section 3.3.2) that S can derive that value. S, therefore, simulates the voter’s
token to find the ciphertext x that produces C∗ (recall that ciphertext x is an ElGamal
pair so x can be written as x1||x2 or (x1, x2). Indeed in next section we will use these.)
The final κ digits of x is the code for the voter’s candidate. S recovers the full ciphertext
for that code from A or B. S also determines which column was fully entered by the voter;
call that the audit column.
Third, S requests from P the random coins used to encrypt each candidate in the audit
column. S posts those on BB, then checks whether the encryptions for each candidate in
that column were computed correctly by P (Note that S knows the order in which V has
seen the audited codes.). If that check fails (or if the brute force search previously failed),
then one or more of P , H, and V is faulty or dishonest. In that case, S refuses to do any
further processing of V ’s vote.
Fourth, S reencrypts x to a new ciphertext E and posts E on BB as V ’s vote. The
reencryption is necessary, because P (having generated the encryptions) knows the plaintext
corresponding to x. So if S directly posted x to BB, then P would easily be able to violate
V ’s privacy.
Fifth, S proves in NIZK that it followed all the above protocol honestly by posting a
proof on BB.
Finally, voter V finishes by recording the vote code and the ballot ID, and by logging
out of S. The voter must check that this recorded information is present on BB, or convey
this information to a third party who does the check on behalf of V . Note that conveying
it does not harm V ’s privacy.
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3.3.6 Voting: S proves its honesty
As mentioned above, S must create universally-verifiable proofs that it correctly selected
and reencrypted the ciphertext x chosen by the voter. The proofs will be posted on BB
and anyone will be able to check it. Here we briefly discuss those proofs and we provide
their technical details in the Appendix A.1. The proof employs standard cryptographic
techniques for constructing a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, based on ring signa-
tures [AOS02, CLMS08] and the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86].
To prove its honesty, S provides:
• Proof of selection: The server S produce two zero-knowledge proofs Px′ and PD,
to show that it correctly computed the voter’s chosen ciphertext x = (x1, x2) from
the inputs C∗ and x∗ that S receives from P . This proof requires S to compute a
pair D = (D1, D2) = (gd, ydhx2), for some value d. To prove that D is of this form,
among other steps, S computes Cx′ = yr
′
h10
κ x′ , and publishes it, where r′ is chosen
randomly and x′ is driven from x2 i.e. x2 = x′||x∗.
• Proof of re-encryption of a ciphertext: S computes a re-encryption E =
(E1, E2) = (g
ex1, y
ex2) of x (where e is chosen at random) so that the computing
platform can’t see how the voter voted. S provides a proof PE to show that it
correctly constructed the re-encryption.
• Proof that the re-encryption is of the selected ciphertext: The proof PE
described in the previous step shows that E is a re-encryption of one of the values
in {A1, . . . , An}, but not that it is the one chosen by the voter. Therefore, to prove
that the (x1, x2) used in the computation of E matches the code chosen by the voter,
S has to show that the x2 in E is the same as the x2 in D. To demonstrate this,
S computes F = (F1, F2) = (E1D1, E2D2) = (gfx1, yfx2hx2) where f = d + e, and
proves that F indeed has this form. S produces another proof PF to show that F
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has the correct form.
By putting Px′ , PD, PE and PF together, S actually proves that E is a re-encryption
of Ai = (Ai,1, Ai,2) where Ai,2 = x2 and x∗2 is involved in C∗. The proofs Px′ , PD, PE and
PF are bound together as a single Schnorr signature proof Ptotal. This proof Ptotal is also
posted on the bulletin board BB. A more detailed description of these proofs is given in
the Appendix A.1.
These constructions are novel, but they make use of the standard signature-based proof
of knowledge (SPK) technique. As Fiat-Shamir [FS86] heuristic is used, we are assured
that the proof is sound and complete, and has the computational zero-knowledge property.
3.3.7 Tabulation
The tellers T receive from S the ciphertext E for each voter. The voter’s names or identities
can be publicly associated with their encrypted vote. This allows any voter to check that
their E is included.
The set of encrypted votes is tabulated by a back end. Du-Vote does not require
any particular back end. One of the standard method from the literature that could
be used based on the current structure of ballots is: a reencryption mixnet, followed by
decryption [JCJ05, CCM08].
Another possibility is to use homomorphic combination, followed by decryption of the
combinations [dMPQ09]. Although Du-Vote ballots are exponential ElGamal ciphertext
(multiplication of the ciphertexts would correspond to addition of the plaintext), however,
the current structure of the ballots would require modification to use homomorphic
combination.
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3.3.8 Verification
Voters and observers take the following steps to verify the integrity of the material on
the bulletin board BB. As usual, we envisage that a variety of programs produced by
different agencies would be available for performing the verification.
During vote processing, S publishes the following information for each vote:
• voter ID
• ciphertexts {A1, . . . , An} from column A, and {B1, . . . , Bn} from column B
• the identity (A or B) of the audited column
• the random values r used for encryption in the audited column
• ballot ID
• outputs C,Cx′ , D1, E, and Ptotal described in Section 3.3.6, where Ptotal includes
Px′ , PD, PE and PF .
Any voter can ensure that her vote is present, by checking that BB contains an entry with
her ballot ID, the value C∗ that she obtained from the code page displayed by P during
voting, and by comparing the audit column shown by P .
Any observer (including any voter) can verify the integrity of the other information,
by performing the following BB verification steps:
1. Identify the randoms used in the audited column, and check the audited ciphertexts
by reconstructing them. Without loss of generality, assume column B is audited and
column A is used to cast vote
2. Verify the ballot ID by computing hash(A,B), where value A denotes the lexico-
graphically sorted sequence of ciphertexts A1, . . . , An in column A, and likewise B
in column B
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3. Identify C and check that the last κ digits of C are C∗
4. Compute Cx∗ = C/h{10
κ(B∗1 ||...||B∗n)}
5. Verify proof Px′
6. Identify Cx′ and compute D2 = Cx∗Cx′ and D = (D1, D2), and verify PD
7. Identify E and verify PE
8. Compute F from D and E and verify PF
9. Check E has been sent to T
These steps involve voters checking the bulletin board and also verifying the zero-
knowledge proofs. We note that not all voters will be able to understand the security
guarantees provided by these checks and they might need to rely on a trusted third party.
It will be useful to make such proofs more intuitive. Indeed in Chapter 4 we will discuss
techniques to make such verification more intuitive.
3.4 Verifiability and privacy analysis
Full security analysis of Du-Vote (similar to [DKR09] or [KRS10]) is beyond the scope of
this chapter. The main contribution here is to introduce the novel ideas that allow secure
voting to take place even if the backend server and the devices the voter interacts with are
all malicious. In this section, we present some results that add detail to this claim.
Du-Vote’s primary objective is to ensure integrity and verifiability of the vote, even if
the voter’s platform is untrusted. Section 3.4.1 is devoted to showing that any manipulation
of a vote by the untrusted platform P or the untrusted server S will be detected with high
probability, even if S and P are corrupt and controlled by the same attacker. Additionally
in Section 3.4.1.2 , we consider the possibility that the hardware token H is corrupt too.
There, we show that even if all three of S, P and H are corrupt and controlled by the same
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attacker, we still obtain detection of large scale manipulation under certain reasonable
assumptions.
A secondary objective of Du-Vote is to ensure privacy of votes. In Section 3.4.2.1 and
3.4.2.2, we assume H is trustworthy, and we argue that privacy of a vote holds even if one
of S or P is corrupt and controlled by an attacker, provided the other one is honest. In
Section 3.4.2.3, we consider the case that H is not trustworthy. We show that although a
privacy attack is possible, it cannot be conducted on a large scale without being detected.
We take the view that integrity and verifiability of the election is more important than
privacy, and that is why our assumptions to guarantee integrity are weaker than those
required to guarantee privacy. Our view about the importance of integrity over privacy is
justified by considering what happens if one of them fails, while the other is preserved.
An election with privacy but no integrity is useless: the outcome is meaningless. But an
election with integrity and no privacy, while not ideal, is still useful (indeed, show-of-hands
elections in committee rooms are used all the time).
3.4.1 Verifiability
We divide our analysis into two parts. In the first part, we assume the hardware tokens
H are trustworthy. In the second one, we consider the case that their manufacture is
controlled by an adversary.
3.4.1.1 Verifiability analysis assuming honest H and corrupt P , S
We show that any manipulation of a vote by the untrusted platform P or the untrusted
server S will be detected with high probability, even if S and P are corrupt and controlled
by the same attacker.
We make the following two assumptions:
• First, we assume that the tokens H are honest.
• Second, we suppose that the BB verification steps detailed in Section 3.3.8 have
3.4 Verifiability and privacy analysis 47
been carried out by some voters or observers, and have passed.
In our first remark we use the well-known cut-and-choose argument:
Remark 1. Suppose a voter V votes and checks that her ballot ID and vote code is present
on BB. With probability at least 50%, P correctly computes the ciphertexts {A1, . . . , An}
and {B1, . . . , Bn} for V .
Proof Sketch: Suppose P incorrectly computes one or more of {B1, . . . , Bn}. With
50% probability voter’s coin toss is tails and she enters (B∗1 || . . . || B∗n|| x∗) into H and
sends C∗ to S. The server S identifies the audited column and requests the randoms
for the ciphertexts corresponding to the audited column {B1, . . . , Bn}, and publishes the
randoms, ciphertexts, voter ID and ballot ID on BB. An observer is now able to check
that the received ciphertext corresponds to the randoms and plaintexts in the correct
order, and that the ciphertexts are the original ones computed by P corresponding to the
commitment in the ballot ID.
As a reminder, n is the number of candidates and κ is the length of codes.
Remark 2. Suppose a voter V votes and checks that her ballot ID and vote code is present
on BB. If P correctly computes the ciphertext x corresponding to the code x∗ chosen by
V , then with probability (10
κ−1)2n2−1
10κ(2n
2−1) , we have that:
(a) S correctly computed the chosen code x∗,
(b) S correctly computed the chosen ciphertext x, and
(c) S correctly computed the re-encryption of ciphertext E.
For example, if κ = 4 and n = 4, this probability is 0.9969. Thus, with high probability, a
correct encryption of the voter’s chosen candidate is submitted to the tellers.
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Proof Sketch: Suppose the ciphertexts {A1, . . . , An} and {B1, . . . , Bn} correctly encrypt
the candidates {a1, . . . , an}. We prove each of the statements (a), (b), (c) in turn.
(a) Suppose without loss of generality that the voter chose to audit {B1, . . . , Bn} and
vote with {A1, . . . , An}; thus she entered B∗1 || . . . ||B∗n||x∗ into H, generating C∗. By
the assumption that the BB verification steps pass, the server receives C∗ correctly.
Next, the server computes possible inputs to H that could have generated C∗. Since
the vote codes are pseudorandom, the probability that the voter has chosen inputs to
H which result in a unique C∗ can be calculated as 10κ−1
10κ
10κ−1
10κ
. . . 10κ−1
10κ
(there are
2n2− 1 factors), which equals (10κ−1)2n
2−1
10κ(2n
2−1) . In this case, since there no collisions on C
∗,
S has no choice but to correctly identify x∗.
(b) Any observer that checks proof Ptotal is assured of the computation of x from x∗.
(c) Any observer that checks proof Ptotal is assured of the computation of re-encryption E
from x.
Putting these remarks together, we obtain Remark 3:
Putting these remarks together, we obtain:
Remark 3. Suppose a voter participates in the election, and later verifies that the bulletin
board contains her ballot ID and vote code. Then the probability that her vote has not been
altered and will be decrypted as cast is 0.5× (10κ−1)2n
2−1
10κ(2n
2−1) .
In the case κ = 4 and n = 4, this probability is 0.4985. Since the attacker’s chance of
manipulating a vote is independent of all the others, the probability of him undetectably
altering more than a few votes quickly becomes negligible.
3.4.1.2 Verifiability analysis assuming corrupt H, P , S
Even if all three of S, P and H are corrupt and controlled by the same attacker, we still
obtain detection of large-scale vote manipulation under some reasonable assumptions. We
explain these assumptions below:
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• The first assumption is that H has no wireless or wired interfaces; the only way for
it to communicate with the outside world is via its keypad and screen. The attacker
controls S and P in real time; he can communicate directly with them. But his
ability to control H is limited to manufacture time. The attacker can choose the
firmware and other data that is installed on H, but once H has been manufactured he
can no longer communicate with it because of the lack of wired or wireless interfaces.
The idea is that H is prevented from learning the election nonce I, and this prevents
it from being useful to the attacker. H’s keyboard does provide a very low-bandwith
channel by which the attacker can try to communicate with it, but that channel is far
too low-bandwith to communicate the high-entropy I and produce the correct ballot
at the same time (Indeed election nonce could be made as much as high-entropy as
required to maintain the security of the elections.).
• The second assumption is that, although the attacker can spread malware to voters’
machines and thus control the P that they execute, it cannot spread malware to all
the machines. Some PCs are well-looked after and some users are cautious enough
to avoid downloading malware.
Some of the Hs may be programmed correctly and others may be programmed
maliciously, in a proportion chosen by the attacker. But we assume he cannot
effectively match dishonest P s with dishonest Hs, because the malware distribution
channels are completely different from the hardware distribution channels. This
means that some honest P s will be paired with dishonest H’s; and we assume those
ones represent a fraction f of all the P ’s (0 ≤ f ≤ 1).
• As before, we also assume that the BB verification steps detailed in Section 3.3.8
have been carried out by some voters or observers, and have passed.
To obtain our result, we note that there are precisely two ways in which a dishonest H
could contribute to an integrity attack:
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1. H could produce a random output instead of the correct one.
2. H could produce an output calculated according to some attack strategy that has
been built into it at manufacture time.
Intuitively, a random output will be very likely to be detected, because S will fail to
find a value x∗ that matches one of the available ciphertexts. We formalise this intuition
in the following remark.
Remark 4. If a dishonest H modifies votes randomly by replacing the code x∗ for a voter’s
chosen candidate with x′, it gets detected with probability 1− {(n− 1)/(10κ − (n+ 1))} by
S. If n = 4 and κ = 4, this probability is 1− 3/9995 ≈ 0.9996.
Proof Sketch: Suppose without loss of generality that the voter chose to audit
{B1, . . . , Bn} and vote using {A1, . . . , An}; thus she entered (B∗1 || . . . ||B∗n||x∗) into H,
where x∗ ∈ {A∗1, . . . , A∗n} . The dishonest H chooses x′∗ randomly instead of x∗ and gener-
ates C ′∗. To succeed in substituting codes, H has to guess x′∗ s.t. x′∗ ∈ {A∗1, . . . , A∗n}−{x∗}.
Device H already knows n+ 1 codes of κ digits that can’t be repeated. So, the probability
of getting a correct code is (n − 1)/(10κ − (n + 1)). If x′∗ /∈ {A∗1, . . . , A∗n} − {x∗} then
C ′∗ will not match as expected by S and the attack will be detected with probability
1−{(n−1)/(10κ− (n+ 1))}. (Recall that S publishes the set of values C,Cx′ , D1, E, Ptotal,
and by our trust assumption, they are verified by some voters and observers.)
Substitution attacks: Instead of relying on H to replace the code x∗ with a random
value (as done in previous remark), an attacker can have strategically placed some data
onto H. Such data allows dishonest P to choose code sequences that covertly trigger
malicious behaviour within H. The attacker can arrange it so that H produces an output
corresponding to a choice which is valid but different from the one made by the voter.
We call such attacks as substitution attacks. For instance, P and H can agree to assign
a code, say c1, to one of the candidates in one column and, say, c2 to attacker’s chosen
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candidate in the other column. While voting, if code c1 appears then H substitutes V ’s
chosen candidate’s code with the code c2.
The risk for the attacker mounting substitution attacks arises when an honest P inad-
vertently triggers the malicious behaviour, resulting in H substituting the voter’s choice
for an invalid one. This will be manifested by some voters having their votes rejected.
Considering the above example, if an honest P assigns code c1 to one of the candidates
in a column but code c2 is not assigned to any candidate in the other column, then if H
replaces V ’s code then the resulting vote will be rejected. We formalise this intuition in
the following remark.
Remark 5. Suppose a fraction f of the platforms P are honest. The server S and
dishonest P ’s are controlled by the same attacker, who also manufactured the devices H.
In order to modify on average N votes, the attacker will on average cause R×N voters to
have their votes rejected, where
R =
f (1− n/10κ) 10κ
((1− f)n+ f) n
For example, if f = 0.5 and n = κ = 4, then R ≈ 500.
Proof Sketch: Suppose the attacker has configured dishonest H with data that allows
P to trigger a substitution attack. Such data can be represented as a series of pairs of
the form (z,Q) where z is the substitute code, and Q is a predicate on the input received
by H which determines whether the substitution is triggered. Thus, if H receives input
satisfying the predicate Q, then H should substitute z for the voter’s chosen code and
compute its response accordingly. The predicate Q can express a set of codes to use
and/or a particular order in which to use them. We write codes(Q) to mean the set of
codes in inputs that satisfy Q. We suppose the attacker has chosen ` lines, (zi, Qi)1≤i≤`.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the sets codes(Qi) are all disjoint (if they are
not, it introduces ambiguity about how P should behave if the codes it should use match
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several sets Qi). We also suppose that the codes of Qi satisfy the predicate Qi only in one
particular order (Allowing more than one order of those codes would increase the risk of
an honest P inadvertently triggering the attack.).
Suppose P has calculated the allowed codes based on I, and the voter has chosen
whether to vote using the left or right column. A dishonest P had the possibility to choose
to trigger the attack if code zi appears in the “vote” column and Qi is true of the “audit”
column. The first of these events occurs with probability n/10κ. The second one occurs
with probability, say, p. Because the two probabilities are independent, their conjunction
occurs with probability np/10κ. Because these joint events are exclusive for different values
of i, we have that P had with probability np`/10κ the possibility to trigger the attack.
Unfortunately for the attacker, an honest P may also trigger the attack. This will
happen if it inadvertently chooses codes that match the codes of some Qi (this occurs
with probability p), and puts in the order of Qi (since there is only one order, this occurs
with probability 1/n). If this inadvertent triggering happens, it will cause the voter’s vote
to be rejected if the code zi is not a valid code; this occurs with probability 1 − n/10κ.
Thus, the proportion of votes that the attacker causes to be rejected because of honest
P ’s is (p`/n)(1− n/10κ).
If an honest P inadvertently triggers the attack, the attacker may be lucky because
the substituted code turns out to be a a valid code. The probability of this combination
of events is (p`/n)(n/10κ).
Recall that the fraction of honest P ’s is f . Thus, the proportion of votes the attacker
inadvertently causes to be rejected is R times as many as he successfully changes, where
R =
f(p`/n)(1− n/10κ)
(1− f)np`/10κ + f(p`/n)(n/10κ) =
f (1− n/10κ) 10κ
((1− f)n+ f) n
Even if the fraction f of honest P ’s is much lower, say 10%, still about 70 times more
votes will inadvertently be rejected than those successfully modified.
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3.4.2 Ballot privacy
If an attacker controls P and S together, it can easily find how a voter voted, even if H is
honest. P can leak the link between candidates and codes to S. Nonetheless, we argue
that an attacker that controls only one of P or S cannot discover how a voter voted.
3.4.2.1 Privacy analysis assuming honest S, H and corrupt P
We claim that if S is honest, an attacker who controls P cannot find how a voter voted.
An attacker who controls P has all the ciphertexts and their randoms and plaintext,
together with the value C∗ entered by the voter, and the set of values C, Cx′ , D1, E, Ptotal
published by S. The values C∗, C, Cx′ , D1, E are determined pseudorandomly from the
high entropy value K and randoms chosen by S that are not available to the attacker.
Therefore these values do not reveal the vote.
The proof Ptotal is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZKP). Such a NIZKP
does not reveal the secret value that is the knowledge to be proved to its verifier; therefore,
P is not able to learn how the voter voted. Our use of a signature-based proof of knowledge
(SPK) technique, by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, to implement the NIZKP, ensures
universal verifiability while preserving user privacy 1.
3.4.2.2 Privacy analysis assuming honest P , H and corrupt S
We claim that if P is honest, then an attacker who controls S can’t find how a voter
voted. The candidates a1, . . . , an are encrypted by P with the teller’s public key y and the
server S does not know the corresponding private key z. (We show that our new variant
of Elgamal is secure, in Appendix A.2.) Moreover, P being honest does not reveal the link
between candidates and codes for the column that voter has used for voting. Therefore, S
has a ciphertext representing V ’s choice, but no other information about it to find how V
1Pass [Pas03] argued that in the common reference string model or the random oracle model non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs do not preserve all of the properties of zero-knowledge proofs, e.g. they
do not preserve deniability from the prover, although the proof does not reveal the secret value to the
verifier. However deniability from a prover is not required in our case.
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voted.
3.4.2.3 Privacy analysis assuming corrupt H
Assuming H has no wireless or wired interfaces, the situation for privacy is same in the
case when P is honest and dishonest H and S are controlled by the attacker as the case
that H is honest. However, if H and P are controlled by the same attacker then H could
leak some information to P via the κ digit code C∗ that V enters into P . For example,
instead of performing the correct computation, H could just output the last entered code
(which belongs to the chosen candidate). This violates the voter’s privacy as the attacker
will learn how the voter voted. However, if the attacker performs this attack on a large
scale then this misbehaviour would be detected, as S will reject the vote and a lot of
rejections will lead to an enquiry to find what went wrong.
3.5 Discussion
Performance: One might think that the search that platform P has to perform to find
ciphertexts matching a given code is inefficient. On average, the platform P has to compute
10κ El Gamal ciphetexts in order to find one that matches the code. If κ = 4, this is
10,000 ciphertexts. However, as explained, P does not have to compute each of these
from scratch. It computes the first one from scratch, and then from a ciphertext (α, β)
it computes the next one as (αg, βy). Hence, to find a ciphertext matching the code, P
computes one ciphertext (i.e. two exponentiations and a multiplication) followed by (on
average) 10κ multiplications.
We conducted a simple experiment to see how long this would take in practice. We
programmed the relevant part of the platform P in Python, and we used a Macbook
Air computer. Once again, we assume κ = 4. For a given plaintext and code, finding a
ciphertext that matches the code took on average 0.24 seconds. (The worst case in our
sample of 1000 trials was 1.72 seconds.) If there are n = 4 candidates, then 8 codes are
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required; thus, the platform P computes the entire code page in 8 ∗ 0.24 < 2 seconds on
average.
Re-usability of token H: In order for H to be reused for multiple elections, a different
key K must be used each time. To see the necessity of this requirement, we show that
an adversary who controls P could manage to learn K over the course of two elections
using the same K. Since P knows 2n candidates for x∗, and since Cx∗ = Khx
∗ is publicly
known, adversary can compute 2n candidates keys for K, as Cx∗ (hx
∗
)−1. If K is re-used
in two elections, he can intersect the set of 2n candidates from the first election with the
2n candidates from the second election, and will likely find only one value in common,
namely real key K.
Therefore, a different key K must be used for each election. A naive way to achieve
this is to store multiple values K1,K2, . . ., Kn, each one dedicated to a particular election.
However, this would require fixing the number of elections in advance. To overcome this
restriction, we suppose that the server S has a fixed set of keys k1, ..., k` for each voter,
and H has the public counterparts Ki = yki . For each election, a set of ` short random
values e1, . . . , en, are publicly announced. Each user programs their H by typing these
values into H. It computes a new election key K =
∏
1≤i≤`K
ei
i , and the server computes
the voter’s key as k =
∑
1≤i≤` ei · ki.
Recovering key from H: An attacker might try to recover the key K stored in H, e.g.
by solving Hidden Number Problem [Aka09]. However, such attack would require very
high number of calls which would be impractical (and H could be rate-limited). Even if
an attacker manages to recover the key, it affects privacy (not integrity), and it requires
the co-operation of the voter.
Error-detecting codes: As described in Section 3.3.5, S must use a brute-force search
to determine what code V entered as a candidate choice. This search might fail if S is
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unable to match voter’s submitted vote code C∗ due to a typing mistake by V .
Error-detecting codes could be employed to help collaborating and honest S,P ,H detect
typing mistakes. For example, the Luhn algorithm [Luh60] could be used by P to add a
single digit checksum after each candidate’s code in both columns A and B. Instead of
entering κ digits for each candidate, V would enter κ + 1 digits. Before computing C∗,
token H would check whether all checksum were correct; if not, H would ask V to retype
them.
Error recovery: Several kinds of errors can arise, which could result in a voter’s vote
being rejected. Some errors arise because of the voter’s mistakes (errors in inputs, for
example); others could arise because of malicious behaviour by P , H or S. Another
possible error could occur if during the search for the voter’s input to H, the server S
finds that there are more than one possible input (a clash due to the small number of
digits in H’s output). Unfortunately, it is difficult to put error recovery procedures in
place without compromising the security properties. In particular, a situation in which the
platform P starts again could allow it to cheat undetectably. Therefore, if any of these
kinds of errors arise, the voter is forced to abandon the attempt to vote and use an alternat-
ive mean (such as polling station voting). We hope to improve this situation in further work.
DoS attacks by P : If P is malicious, it could refuse to cooperate in casting a vote for
V , perhaps by not posting values on BB, or by posting incorrect values. V can observe
this behaviour and vote using a different P . Moreover, V can inform election authorities
about the possibility of election specific malware, which could be investigated later.
A more subtle attack by P would be to simulate following the Du-Vote protocol
honestly, and show a faked bulletin board to V instead of the real BB. So V needs to
check BB from another P , or convey sufficient information to a trusted third party so that
it can perform the BB verification steps from Section 3.3.8 on V ’s behalf. As previously
mentioned in Section 3.3.5, conveying this information does not harm V ’s privacy.
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With either of these attacks, the worst effect P can have is denial of service. P cannot
modify the votes.
Malicious S: One might think that a malicious S could ignore any malicious behaviour
it detects from P . But S is expected to create a public audit trail on BB. If many voters
or observers detect cheating behavior in that audit trail, the collusion between S and P
will be detected. So if S wants to maintain its reputation as an honest voting service, it
cannot engage in large-scale, detectable attacks.
Limitation on the number of candidates: Du-Vote does not place an upper bound
on the number of candidates in an election. But, from a usability perspective, it would be
tedious for voters to enter a long string of digits into H. This problem can be addressed by
changing the set of codes that are typed into H. Currently, the user types all n codes of
the audit column, plus one code for her vote. But alternative arrangements could require
the user only to type some of the audit codes.
3.6 Comparison with the related work
In this section we briefly compare Du-Vote with some existing internet voting systems that
makes efforts to overcome untrusted platform problem.
• The system proposed by Haenni and Koenig (explained in section 2.3.2) come closest
to Du-Vote. Their system requires a trusted device for voting over the internet on an
untrusted platform. Recall that in their system, the platform generates encryptions in
the form of barcodes, the voter makes her selection on the trusted device by scanning
chosen candidate’s barcode and later transfers her vote to a trusted computer.
That device requires a camera, matrix barcode reader, and uplink to a computer.
Compared to Du-Vote’s hardware token, that device is complicated and difficult
to make trustworthy. Their hardware device learns the voter’s vote. Moreover, a
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camera built-in into an untrusted platform may record a voter’s behaviour while she
scans her chosen candidate’s barcode. In Du-Vote voters do not need to trust the
hardware token for privacy.
• Neumann et al. [NFVK13, NV12] extend JCJ/Civitas with a smart card to manage
voter credentials, however, unlike Du-Vote that scheme does not protect the voter’s
privacy from an untrusted machine. For integrity smart card needs to be trusted
and cut-and-choose mechanism is used to make sure that correct vote is encrypted.
Several other variants of Civitas improve the usability of the aspects related to
verifiability [SHKS11] and coercion-resistance [CH11], but similar to JCJ/Civitas
they still rely on trusted machines.
• Chaum et al. [CFN+11] introduce a computational assistant to verify the vote cast
on a voting machine inside a polling station. This system is designed for polling-place
voting, whereas Du-Vote is suitable for remote voting.
• SureVote and Pretty Good Democracy (PGD) use the voter’s computer as an
untrusted communication channel. The computer is used only to send and receive
codes from the sheet. Integrity depends on secrecy of the code sheets in both
SureVote and PGD , but Du-Vote does not require code pages to be secret.
• Helios let voters audit/challenge their computer to prove it acted honestly in en-
crypting their candidate choice. However, the voters need trustworthy computers
to verify those proofs. Du-Vote does not require a trustworthy computer. In Helios,
the voter’s computer automatically learns how the voter voted. Du-Vote guarantees
privacy as long as either P is honest, or H and S are honest. This is better because
voters who are technically competent can protect their privacy by making sure that
their own computer is free from any election-specific malware. Voters who don’t
trust their computers can rely on trustworthiness of the devices (H and S) provided
by the election authorities.
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• Remotegrity assumes a secure means of distributing the ballots and authorization
cards. Since Du-Vote needs to securely distribute a hardware token that is used to
authenticate votes, Remotegrity could be seen as a paper-based analogue of Du-Vote.
Both systems solve the problem of untrusted computing platforms, but Du-Vote does
so without relying on paper, invisible ink and scratch-offs, or auditing of printed
ballots (which is required by Scantegrity II and necessitates use of a random beacon
and a distinguished group of auditors).
• In [KR16], authors provide an extensive security analysis of Du-Vote. They show
some attacks and also propose changes to the system that would avoid such attacks.
3.7 Concluding remarks
Conventional wisdom used to hold that remote voting cannot be secure, because voters’
computers themselves are not secure [JRSW04]. Research in the last decade, though,
indicates that voters do not need fully trustworthy computers. With voter-initiated
auditing [Ben06, Ben07], computers prove to voters that votes are properly encrypted—
but voters are instructed to seek out many computers, so that at least one is likely to be
honest, and computers must still be trusted for privacy.
In this chapter we proposed to use a dedicated hardware token to overcome the
untrusted platform problem. By using this token, Du-Vote doesn’t require voters to trust
general-purpose computer for integrity, nor does it require voters to trust computers for
privacy. We also discovered that the token need not be trusted for integrity provided that
the adversary cannot communicate with it after the election opens. We are now optimistic,
based on the techniques developed in this work, that secure internet voting systems can
be deployed without requiring any trust in the computers used by voters.
Could we replace Du-Vote’s special-purpose tokens with smartphones? Users might
download a simple app that simulates the Du-Vote token. Preventing untrustworthy
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smartphones from conspiring with other computers to violate verifiability and privacy—
especially preventing communication with the adversary—would be challenging, as would
be distributing the secret values stored by tokens. Du-Vote’s security degrades gracefully
when the token is malicious, so it might be possible to address these concerns. If so,
smartphones could be profitably employed to improve usability.
CHAPTER 4
Trivitas: Improving verifiability for voters
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4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, election verifiability in presence of a
bulletin board is conveniently split in three notions i.e. Individual verifiability, Universal
verifiability, and Eligibility verifiability.
One problem with the way election verifiability, especially individual verifiability is
usually achieved is that the voter is not able to see her vote at the time she visits the
bulletin board after casting a ballot. This is the case in Helios, Prêt à Voter, JCJ/Civitas,
and others. The reason is in order to achieve the property of coercion-resistance, which
asserts that the voter shouldn’t be able to prove to a potential coercer how she voted.
Therefore, individual verifiability is achieved by indirect means; the voter can check that
the encrypted ballot is present, and has some other evidence (perhaps based on auditing)
that the encrypted ballot really represents her vote. Moreover, after the ballots are
anonymized, the voter even looses track of her encrypted ballot.
Voters are likely to find this indirect achievement of individual verifiability unsatisfactory.
This feeling has arisen in the focus groups that were held as part of the EPSRC project
Trustworthy Voting Systems [SLC+11]. Four hour-long managed discussions among groups
of about 10 citizens were arranged by a professional facilitator, with the aim of soliciting
people’s opinions about Prêt à Voter. In at least two of the discussions, participants
questioned the worthiness of checking the presence of their ballot on the bulletin board,
given that they did not have any direct evidence that the ballot really contained their vote.
The issue has also been mentioned by Adida and Neff [AN06], where the requirement that
verifiability should be direct and end to end has been highlighted.
Our contribution. In this chapter we introduce Trivitas, a protocol based on JCJ/Civitas
(described in Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1.1). We show how the credentials of JCJ/Civitas can
be adapted to improve individual verifiability. In particular, we show how voters can see
their own vote in plaintext present on bulletin board, making the verification experience
direct, and more intuitive; without loosing coercion-resistance.
4.1 Introduction 63
Our first idea is the notion of trial votes. A trial vote is a vote that is cast along with
real votes, but will not be counted. It will be decrypted and exposed along the way, in a
way that is traceable by the vote who has cast it. Since most of the system components are
not able to distinguish trial and real votes, it gives confidence in the correct handling of
all votes. This is an extension of the ideas of auditing in [CRS05, Adi08], with the crucial
difference that the auditing process is performed not only in the phase of casting a ballot,
but is spread throughout the whole election process. In other words, a trial credential
will function as a marker whose sign is that the handling of this ballot should be made
transparent, by e.g. decrypting and publishing its contents at every stage. There are a
few technical difficulties with that, because trial ballots can fulfil their role only as long as
they are not identified as such by possibly corrupted agents in the voting system. To avoid
this problem, we make use of the fact that the decryption key is distributed among a set of
tellers and propose to decrypt trial ballots by running a decryption mix [Cha04, CRS05]
among the tellers.
Our second idea is based on the following observation: real credentials are indistin-
guishable for anyone (except for the voter) from trial credentials and fake credentials (an
element that JCJ/Civitas introduces to enable coercion-resistance). Therefore, without
compromising coercion-resistance, for each ballot (be it real, trial or fake) we can publish
after anonymization (done by a re-encryption mixnet [JJR02]) its corresponding credential
and the decrypted vote. This allows a voter to verify that all its votes have made it into
the final tally: its real vote, its trial vote and its possible fake votes. There is again a
technical difficulty, related to eligibility verifiability and coercion-resistance: trial votes
and fake votes have to be eliminated from the final tally in a publicly verifiable way, hence
a coercer could observe that the credential obtained from the voter is fake. To avoid this
problem we again make use of a decrytion mix run by the tellers: there is no way to link
the decrypted contents of a ballot to ballots that will be eliminated to enforce eligibility.
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Outline of the chapter. In section 4.2 we review election verifiability in JCJ/Civitas.
Then, we make specific our critique of individual verifiability, that can be extended to
systems like Prêt à Voter and Helios. In section 4.3, we describe our proposal. In section
4.4, we show initial ideas about how trial credentials could be used to improve universal
verifiability and recoverability. Finally, in section 4.5 we argue that changing JCJ/Civitas
in the way that we propose does not compromise the coercion-resistance guarantees of the
original system, and we give a hint of how the proof of [JCJ05] could be adapted to prove
coercion-resistance for the new system.
4.2 Verifiability in JCJ/Civitas
We gave an overview of JCJ/Civitas in Chapter 2 in Section 2.3.1.1. In this section we
explain how verifiability is ensured in JCJ/Civitas.
4.2.1 Election verifiability
Recall that in JCJ/Civitas the re-encryption mix, the plaintext equivalence tests and the
decrypted votes are accompanied by zero-knowledge proofs to ensure the operations have
been correctly performed. Universal verifiability and eligibility verifiability are achieved
from these proofs by posting them on the bulletin board, this way allowing any external
auditor to check their validity.
More specifically, Universal verifiability and eligibility verifiability in JCJ/Civ-
itas are achieved as follows:
• Mix proofs allow auditors O to verify that a ballot coming out of the mix net Mix
(i.e. belonging to the set BBmix) corresponds to some recorded ballot (i.e. belonging
to the set BBcast), and also that no recorded ballot has been discarded.
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• PET proofs and proofs Psν from the ballot allow O to verify that only votes coming
from eligible voters are kept on the bulletin board for final decryption.
• Decryption proofs allow O to verify that all countable votes have been correctly
decrypted.
Individual verifiability in JCJ/Civitas is achieved as follows:
1. Voter must trust her voting platform P that her cast ballot correctly encodes her
vote.
2. Voter can check the bulletin board BB to see that her cast ballot has been correctly
recorded.
3. Universal verifiability of mix netsMix ensures that all the recorded votes are correctly
mixed, and therefore the vote cast by V is included in the set of mixed ballots.
4. Universal verifiability of plaintext equivalence tests (pet) ensures that at least one copy
of V ’s ballot is kept after the elimination of duplicates. Moreover, the proof PQ that
the voter obtains during registration ensures that her private credential corresponds
to a public credential in the electoral roll ER. Universal verifiability of mix nets
ensures that a re-encryption of her public credential is also present in the anonymized
electoral roll BBaer. Universal verifiability of pets ensures that valid ballots are not
eliminated when credentials are checked against the anonymised electoral roll BBaer.
Altogether, these give to V an assurance that her ballot is identified as coming from
an eligible voter and is not eliminated during the enforcement of eligibility.
5. Finally, universal verifiability of distributed decryption ensures that V ’s ballot is
correctly decrypted and tallied.
Some systems, e.g Prêt à Voter [CRS05] and Helios [Adi08], improve the first point
with a cut-and-choose mechanism, that allows the voter to audit a ballot before casting a
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vote.
Our critique of individual verifiability in JCJ/Civitas, Prêt à Voter and Helios
refers more generally to systems that rely on universal verifiability to achieve end-to-end
individual verifiability. The points 3, 4 and, 5 above to ensure individual verifiability
require complex mathematical operations and the corresponding verification algorithms
must be run on a trusted platform. Moreover, even if the corresponding zero-knowledge
proofs are rigorously tailored to ensure the desired properties, the ordinary voter may be
left wondering if her vote has actually been counted in the final tally. While auditors may
be expected to have access to trusted platforms and to understand the concepts behind
zero-knowledge proofs, we do not consider these assumptions satisfactory when individual
verifiability is considered.
Let us also note the following limiting aspect of the cut-and-choose mechanism in
[Ben06, CRS05] and [Adi08]. In all these systems, the audited ballot is handled as a real
ballot, but only up to the point when the voter decides to audit it. Once audit is chosen,
the ballot is discarded. Only one ballot gets to be cast and submitted to the bulletin
board. In our proposal, the audited ballot, that we call a trial ballot, will be handled in
the same way as a real ballot at each phase of the protocol, while additionally playing
its role as an audit ballot. In particular, it will be posted on the bulletin board before
mixing and handled subsequently in the mix and in the decryption phase. The traditional
cut-and-choose guarantees are recovered in this setting by tracking the trial ballot and the
corresponding decrypted vote on the bulletin board before the mix.
4.3 Trivitas: trial credentials and universal decryption
The first proposal of Trivitas is the notion of trial credentials. A trial credential is a
credential that allows a voter to cast a vote that will not be counted in the final tally, but
will appear on the bulletin board at several stages of the tabulation phase. Its purpose is
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to allow the voter to gain confidence in the correct operation of the system. Trial ballots
are identifiable as such only by a threshold set of tellers, thus any component of the system
has to treat the set of all ballots in the same way. We show how trial credentials can be
implemented in the context of JCJ/Civitas and show their immediate benefit for individual
verifiability.
Moreover, we propose another addition to JCJ/Civitas, independent of trial credentials,
that brings a further improvement to individual verifiability: we decrypt and publish
the content of all ballots after the mix. Therefore, for every ballot that a voter has cast
(real, trial or fake), she can verify that the corresponding credential and vote occur on the
bulletin board after the mix. This gives a direct evidence to the voter that her ballots,
and most importantly her real ballot, have been correctly constructed by the platform P
and processed by the mix network.
4.3.1 Overview of proposed additions
In this section we explain the additions that we propose in each phase of JCJ/Civitas:
Registration. Recall that in JCJ/Civitas each voter receives private share of her real
voting credentials s1, . . . , sn. In Trivitas, mirroring the set of real credentials s1, . . . , sn we
assume that registrars also generate a set of trial credentials st1, . . . , stn. The set st1, . . . , stn
is constructed and distributed to voters following the same protocols as for s1, . . . , sn,
thus we can assume the same security properties: in particular, trial credentials are
indistinguishable from real credentials and fake credentials, for anyone but for the voter
that receives its share. In addition to the electoral roll ER, now we have a trial roll TR,
that contains the public parts of the trial credentials enc(st1; pkT ), . . . , enc(stn; pkT ). We
omit randomness from this notation of encryption as it is clear from the context.
Voting. In addition to constructing a ballot (enc(sv; pkT ), enc(ν; pkT ),Pcorr,Psν) as in JCJ/-
Civitas, voter V additionally constructs a trial ballot (enc(stv; pkT ), enc(νt; pkT ),Ptcorr,Ptsν)
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and uploads both the real ballot and the trial ballot to the bulletin board (at implementa-
tion level, it could be decided if a ballot construction form would be used twice or if the
system would allow the construction of both ballots at the same time). Both real and trial
ballots are added to the set BBcast.
Verification of proofs and mixing. At the time of ballot validation (i.e. just after the
voting phase ends), the trial roll TR is anonymized with mix and mixed trial credentials
are stored in a set BBatr. This is done in addition to electoral roll ER anonymization
and mixed credentials being stored in set BBaer. All other verification operations are
performed as done in verification phase of JCJ/Civitas.
Tabulation. The tellers T first start with performing plaintext equivalence test of ballots
in BBvalid against BBatr (Recall that BBvalid is the set of cast ballots with valid zero-
knowledge proofs of correctness). For all ballots for which this pet returns true, the tellers
decrypt the corresponding credential and the corresponding vote and publish them on
the bulletin board: this is represented as a set BBTrialsA. Formally, tellers publish on
the bulletin board the result of PETDecryptUnlink(BBvalid, BBatr), where the motivation,
specification and the algorithm for PETDecryptUnlink are discussed in section 4.3.3.
The set of all the valid ballots (that includes the trial ballots i.e. BBvalid) are again
sent to the mixnet Mix for anonymization. Just after this mix and before the pet tests
for eligibility enforcement, all ballots are decrypted and their corresponding decrypted
credentials and decrypted votes are posted on the bulletin board as a set BBDecBallots. To
preserve coercion-resistance of the system, this has to be done in a way that does not link
the published credentials and votes to the corresponding ballot. We propose the use of a
decryption mix DecryptUnlink(BBmix), whose idea is discussed in section 4.3.3 as well.
At the time of eligibility enforcement, credentials in BBmix are additionally tested
against the trial roll BBatr. If a ballot is identified as trial, it is not discarded but is
labelled as such on the bulletin board. Finally, all ballots that remain on the bulletin
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board after eligibility enforcement are decrypted and only votes that do not correspond to
trial ballots are tallied. If a ballot is labelled as a trial ballot, the corresponding credential
is also decrypted. The decrypted trial ballots after the tabulation form the set BBTrialsB.
4.3.2 Individual verifiability in Trivitas
A voter can trace her trial vote in each phase of the system: it should be present on
the bulletin board in the set BBTrialsA, after the voting phase, and in the set BBTrialsB,
after the tabulation phase. Moreover, relying on the decryption of all the ballots after
the mix, the result of which is the set BBDecBallots on the bulletin board, the voter can
check that the encryption and the mix has been correct for all of her cast ballots: the
one with a real credential, the one with a trial credential and possibly the ones with
fake credentials. Hence, fake credentials can also be used for the purpose of end-to-end
individual verifiability. In summary, the tests that voter Vi perform and the properties
that are assured are shown in table 4.1.
Verifiability test Assured property
IV1 The pair (sti, νti ) occurs in
the set BBTrialsA on the bul-
letin board
The platform has correctly en-
coded Vi’s votes and Vi’s ballots
have been correctly recorded on
the bulletin board
IV2 The pairs (si, νi), (sti, νti ) and
all (sfi , ν
f
i ) occur in the set
BBDecBallots on the bulletin
board
All of Vi’s submitted ballots have
been input in the mixnetMix and
have been correctly processed and
output by Mix
IV3 The pair (sti, νti ) occurs in
the set BBTrialsB on the bul-
letin board
Vi’s intended vote occurs in the
final outcome
Table 4.1: Individual verifiability tests and assured properties in Trivitas
Let us argue why all these tests are valid, in the sense that, if they are satisfied for the
voter Vi, then the claimed properties hold with high probability for all of Vi’s ballots: trial,
real and fake. We leave rigorous proofs along the lines of [JCJ05, KRS10] as future work,
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and perform only an informal analysis below. Recall that JCJ/Civitas makes the trust
assumption that: at least one of tellers T is honest. We make the same trust assumption
for Trivitas.
We explain below why IV1, IV2, and IV3 are valid:
IV1. The assumption that at least one T is honest ensures that the decryption of
trials is correct: the published trial pair is indeed the content of Vi’s trial ballot, that is
present on the bulletin board. Then, the fact that a trial credential is indistinguishable
from a real credential ensures that a cheating voting platform or a cheating bulletin board
has to make a random guess if it wants to substitute a voter’s ballot, thus having at least
a 50% probability of being detected.
IV2. Similarly, the assumption that at least one T is honest ensures that the set of
published pairs (BBDecBallots) corresponds to the decryption of ballots output by Mix
(BBmix). Therefore, IV2 assures that all of Vi’s ballots are correctly output by the Mix.
Moreover, note that IV2 increases the assurance offered by IV1, because Vi can check the
correct construction and transmission of all her ballots. Still, IV1 is useful to detect a
potential problem as early as possible and also to identify more precisely the elements of
the system that have caused the problem. For instance, we will see in section 4.4 how IV1
allows for recoverability when a problem is detected before the mix.
IV3. The parallel decryption of trial votes gives some evidence to the voter that votes
are not arbitrarily eliminated during eligibility enforcement. This is again formally ensured
by assumption that at least one T is honest.
4.3.3 Anonymous PETs and distributed decryption with
ciphertext-plaintext unlinkability
We now come back to two cryptographic components of the proposed system that have
been left out in section 4.3.1: PETDecryptUnlink and DecryptUnlink. PETDecryptUnlink
is used to decrypt trial ballots while keeping them indistinguishable from other ballots.
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This is necessary for being able to rely on trial ballots to audit the system even after
they are decrypted. DecryptUnlink is used to decrypt all ballots, without revealing the
link between individual ballots and their content. This is necessary to preserve coercion-
resistance: otherwise, a coercer could detect that a ballot cast with a fake credential has
been eliminated before the final tally.
Recall that votes and credentials are encrypted with public key pkT , whose correspond-
ing private part skT is distributed among T . In the following, we assume T = {T1, . . . , Tn}.
For simplicity, we denote enc(s; pkT ) = es,we denote enc(ν; pkT ) = eν, and the encrypted
credentials on TR (i.e. BBatr) as es′1, . . . , es′k. The specification for PETDecryptUnlink and
DecryptUnlink is as follows:
PETDecryptUnlink
Input: S = (es1, eν1), . . . , (esm, eνm) and TR = es′1, . . . , es′k
Output: O = {(s, ν) | ∃iS ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ∃iTR ∈ {1, . . . , k},
dec(esiS) = dec(es
′
iTR
) = s & dec(eνiS) = ν}
Unlinkability: for all (s, ν) ∈ O, the index iS of (enc(s; pkT ), enc(ν; pkT )) in S is
indistinguishable from a random number in {1, . . . ,m}.
DecryptUnlink
Input: S = (es1, eν1), . . . , (esm, eνm)
Output: O = {(s, ν) | ∃iS ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. dec(esiS) = s & dec(eνiS) = ν}
Unlinkability: for all (s, ν) ∈ O, the index iS of (enc(s; pkT ), enc(ν; pkT )) in S is
indistinguishable from a random number in {1, . . . ,m}.
Our proposed implementation for PETDecryptUnlink and DecryptUnlink is an adaptation
of the decryption mix idea present in [Cha04, CRS05] to the case of distributed El-Gamal.
This setting has already been studied in e.g. [FMM+02, Fur04], that show how the shuﬄe
can be made verifiable. However, since we do not require a verifiable shuﬄe for our
application (a misbehaviour during decryption would be detected by the voter by simply
observing the trial credentials) our algorithms are more straightforward and do not provide
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zero-knowledge proofs. We only describe the algorithm for PETDecryptUnlink, the second
algorithm being similar and more simple. We describe the algorithm for one trial credential
et from the set TR and the algorithm is applied iteratively to every credential. (Recall
the shape of enc(m; pkT ) is a pair (gr,m · yr).)
PETDecryptUnlink. For all public trial credentials et in TR, the parties T1, . . . , Tn
(holding private key shares x1, . . . , xn) run the following protocol:
Initial phase (can be run publicly by any party).
Assume et = (a, b) and, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, assume esi = (ai, bi). Compute and publish p1 =
(a1
a
, b1
b
), . . . , pm = (
am
a
, bm
b
). The input for T1 in the next phase is (p1, es1, eν1), . . . , (pm, esm, eνm).
PET phase (being run privately and consequently by each of T1, . . . , Tn).
Let (p1, es1, eν1), . . . , (pm, esm, eνm) be the input for Ti. Create new random numbers
rp1, . . . , r
p
m ∈ Z∗q, rs1, . . . , rsm ∈ Z∗q, rν1 , . . . , rνm ∈ Z∗q and compute
• (c1, d1) = renc(p1, rp1), . . . , (cm, dm) = renc(pm, rpm)
• es′1 = renc(es1, rs1), . . . , es′m = renc(esm, rsm)
• eν ′1 = renc(eν1, rν1), . . . , eν ′m = renc(eνm, rνm)
Partially decrypt (c1, d1), . . . , (cm, dm), i.e. compute d′1 =
d1
c
xi
1
, . . . , d′m =
dm
c
xi
m
.
Choose a permutation σ of {1, . . . ,m} and publish
((cσ(1), d
′
σ(1)), es
′
σ(1), eν
′
σ(1)), . . . , ((cσ(m), d
′
σ(m)), es
′
σ(m), eν
′
σ(m))
This is the input for Ti+1.
Decryption phase (run jointly by T1, . . . , Tn). For all (p, es, eν) in the output of Tn:
if p = 1, perform a distributed decryption of es and of eν and make the result part of the
output set: O := O ∪ {(dec(es), dec(eν))}.
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If at least one of T1, . . . , Tn behaves honestly, PETDecryptUnlink satisfies also the
unlinkability requirement, as formalized and proved in [Fur04].
Intuitively, the values p1, . . . , pm after the initial phase represents an encryption of
a number that record whether the credential encrypted in et is equal to the credential
encrypted in es: if that number is 1, then it is equal, otherwise not.
Then, the goal of the next phase is to decrypt p1, . . . , pm in order to determine the
encrypted ballots that correspond to trial credentials. These elements are passed from one
party to the next party in turn, in order to partially decrypt them with each share of the
secret key. As output of Tn, we will get either 1 or a random number.
In addition, we have re-encryptions and secret permutations of ballots. This is performed
in order to ensure the additional requirement of unlinkability. So, if one of the pi at the
end is 1, we do not know where that ballot came from, i.e. we don’t know the link between
the ballot to be decrypted and the corresponding input ballot
4.4 Other properties
In this section we discuss other possible applications of trial credentials.
4.4.1 Universal verifiability
We propose the following universal verifiability test for Trivitas:
Verifiability test Assured property
UV All the trials published before the
mix are in the set of decrypted
ballots after the mix, i.e. BBTrialsA
⊆ BBDecBallots, and they have the
same number of occurrences
The mixnetMix is correctly
processing all the ballots
Table 4.2: UV test and assured property
We propose this test as an addition to the current universal verifiability proofs, not
as a replacement: it is more efficient, but probably offers less assurance than traditional
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zero-knowledge proofs. On the other hand, this test could also be combined with other
tests that offer lesser guarantees of correctness but better performance [BG02], in order to
improve their assurance while preserving their efficiency.
Now we show the validity of UV . Because PETDecryptUnlink(BBcast, BBatr) does not
give away what ballots among BBcast are trials, Mix has to treat all the cast ballots in
BBcast uniformly. In particular, if it chooses to cheat on a subset of ballots in BBcast, this
subset is random. Therefore, if there are enough trial ballots (this could be ensured for
instance by letting observers insert any number of trials), a dishonest behaviour of Mix
would be detected with high probability by the test UV .
These arguments hold only when the voting platforms P is trusted. Otherwise, if P
and Mix are both controlled by the same attacker the a corrupt Mix could differentiate
trial ballots from other ballots when they are decrypted. We address this problem by a
variant of Trivitas that does not let the platform learn which ballots are trials, even when
they are decrypted (section 4.4.3).
4.4.2 Recoverability from failed verification
What happens when individual verifiability fails, e.g. an incorrect trial vote is published
along a voter’s trial credential? In general, this issue is quite complex, because it requires
procedures to determine who is telling the truth: the voter or the voting system. For
Trivitas, our proposed recoverability technique is straightforward and requires only a slight
modification to the system: trials are decrypted and published in short time after the
ballots are cast and voter V does not have to wait for the end of the voting phase to verify
a trial. In this case, if a voter observes a problem with her trial vote on the bulletin board,
she should simply re-vote, using a potentially safer platform. The policy for handling
duplicate votes would then be to consider only the last vote as being valid, because it is
the vote in which the voter has the highest confidence.
However, like in the case of universal verifiability, this solution is not ideal, because
an untrusted platform P could make a distinction between trial credentials and valid
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credentials, after trial ballots are decrypted. The variant of Trivitas in the next section
addresses this issue.
4.4.3 The case of an untrusted voting platform
In Chapter 3, we show how to achieve both privacy and verifiability in the presence of an
untrusted voting platform by using a dedicated hardware token. Here we propose a variant
of Trivitas whose aim is to allow universal verifiability and recoverability, as discussed in
previous section, even in presence of an untrusted voting platform. The main property
of this variant is that it preserves the secrecy of the trial credential, while still allowing
the voter to verify a trial vote relying on that credential. The cost is a slightly more
complicated voting and vote verification experience:
• along with credentials s and st, the voter additionally receives (or constructs) two
numbers: one corresponding to a random number r and one to enc(r; pkT ). We may
assume that the same protocol is run for obtaining s, st and r and hence that the
value of r is secret and known only to the voter.
• when constructing a ballot, the voter inputs not only the credential and the vote,
but also enc(r; pkT ).
• when decrypting trial ballots, the tellers T do not decrypt directly the credential
enc(st; pkT ) but instead multiply it with enc(r; pkT ), to obtain enc(st ·r; pkT ) (relying
on the homomorphic properties of ElGamal) and decrypt it to st ·r. Hence, instead of
looking for a pair (st, νt) on the bulletin board (like in the basic version of Trivitas),
the voter would look for (st · r, νt) (for usability, one can see that an additive
homomorphism, also possible with ElGamal, would be better here).
In this variation of Trivitas, even if the voting platform is compromised, it can not be
used to identify which ballots are trials. Hence, trial ballots can also be used for universal
verifiability. For recoverability, a trial credential could be used multiple times and the
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platform would still be forced to take a 50% chance of getting caught each time when it is
cheating. However, compared to our work proposed in Chapter 3, it is more complicated.
4.5 Coercion-resistance in Trivitas
In this section we discuss why Trivitas offers the same coercion-resistance guarantees as
JCJ/Civitas. Coercion-resistance in JCJ/Civitas relies on the ability of the voter to create
a fake credential s′ and a fake proof P′Q that satisfy the following properties:
• given a pair (si,PiQ), a coercer can not determine if the pair represents a voter’s real
credential and proof (s,PQ) or if it represents a fake pair (s′,P′Q). This is due to
the fact that at least one registrar is assumed to be honest and the communication
channel used with that registrar is assumed to be untappable.
• if a ballot with a fake credential is submitted, it will be eliminated from the final
tally in the tabulation phase, during eligibility enforcement. Crucially, all ballots
have been mixed and re-encrypted and at least one member of the mix network is
assumed to be honest. This ensures that a coercer can not observe to what credentials
correspond the ballots that have not been included in the final tally.
As usual, we also have to assume that there are enough votes for each candidate, so
that the coercer can not observe that the voter did not follow her instructions from the
mere outcome of the election.
The first addition of Trivitas, trial credentials, does not affect the way in which real
ballots and fake ballots are handled by the election system. The only observable difference
for the coercer is the presence of decrypted trial ballots at every phase and this does not
give any information about real ballots or fake ballots. In particular, the two properties
mentioned above remain true in presence of trial ballots.
The second addition of Trivitas, universal decryption, is potentially more problematic for
coercion-resistance, since it concerns all the recorded ballots. However, coercion-resistance
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is preserved by two crucial points:
• all ballots are decrypted, without making a difference between real credentials, fake
credentials and trial credentials. This ensures that, in Trivitas as in JCJ/Civitas,
the coercer can not determine if a credential is valid or not.
• the algorithm applied to decrypt all ballots is a decryption mix, i.e. we apply
DecryptUnlink(MixedBallots). It may be surprising that a set of anonymized ballots
is decrypted with a decryption mix. However, this is needed because tellers must
eliminate fake ballots in a publicly verifiable way. In that case, if the coercer could
additionally see the contents of all ballots, he could determine what credentials were
invalid.
Intution towards a formal proof. A formal proof is out of scope of this thesis but we
expect that the coercion-resistance proof for JCJ/Civitas [JCJ05] could be extended to cover
Trivitas. To define coercion-resistance for an election system EVS in a computational
model, [JCJ05] considers an ideal system EVSI where the outcome of the election is
“magically” computed: the adversary can observe only the final outcome and is not able to
influence anything more than vote choices for the compromised voters. Then, a system is
said to satisfy coercion-resistance if the probability of a polynomial time adversary being
able to determine if it has been cheated is roughly the same when the election is run by
EVS as in the case when the election is run by EVSI .
The proof of coercion-resistance is a reduction to (a variant of) the Decisional-Diffie
Hellman (DDH) assumption. The proof relies on a simulator S that behaves either as
EVS or as EVSI , depending on whether its input is a Diffie-Hellman tuple or not. If there
would be a polynomial time adversary that breaks coercion-resistance, i.e. it has better
chances of coercion when EVS is used instead of EVSI , then that adversary could be used
by the simulator S to determine if its input is a Diffie-Hellman tuple in polynomial time.
This would break the DDH assumption.
To extend this proof to Trivitas all we have to do is to show that the simulator S of
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[JCJ05] can also execute the additional operations, i.e. the management of trial credentials
and the universal decryption of all ballots after the mix. This is possible because the
simulator of [JCJ05] holds the private key skT and can therefore decrypt ballots at any
time. This makes it possible to simulate both the audit of trial ballots and the universal
decryption. Moreover, the same simulator can easily create trial credentials and trial
ballots, this process being similar to the creation of real credentials and ballots.
4.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we proposed Trivitas; a protocol that achieves direct and end-to-end
individual verifiability, while at the same time preserving coercion-resistance. We propose
the use of trial credentials, as a way to track and audit the handling of a ballot from one
end of the election system to the other end, without increased complexity on the voter
end. Secondly, due to indistinguishability of credentials from random values, we observe
that the association between any credential and its corresponding vote can be made public
at the end of the election process, without compromising coercion-resistance. The voter
has more intuitive and direct evidence that her intended vote has not been changed and
will be counted in the final tally.
The idea of trial ballots is not necessarily specific to JCJ/Civitas. We believe it could
be implemented in other electronic voting systems as well. The universal decryption of
ballots after the mix relies on the notion of credentials, to allow voters to identify their
votes, and of fake credentials, to allow coercion-resistance. Credentials are also interesting
for eligibility verifiability, possible in JCJ/Civitas but generally not possible in other
systems. Hence, it would be interesting to investigate the possibility of adding a credential
infrastructure on top of other E-voting protocols.
CHAPTER 5
Caveat Coercitor: Coercion evidence in internet voting
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5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background and motivation
Current research in electronic voting focuses on trying to design usable voting systems
that satisfy the properties of coercion-resistance and verifiability. Coercion-resistance is a
strong fundamental property of electronic voting systems. It states that a voter should be
able to cast her vote as intended, even in presence of a coercer that may try to force her
to cast a different vote. On the other hand, verifiability allows to verify that the outcome
of the election reflects correctly the voters choice. A voter can verify that the ballot has
been correctly recorded on the bulletin board, and anyone can verify that the recorded
ballots from eligible voters are tallied correctly.
Especially in internet voting, coercion-resistance and verifiability are extremely hard to
achieve together and this leads to schemes of questionable usability or to trust assumptions
that are difficult to meet in practice. Perhaps the system that comes closest to satisfying
both those properties in their strongest form is JCJ/Civitas (see section 2.3.1.1). However,
it does so at the cost of usability. In JCJ/Civitas and in our work in Chapter 4, to achieve
coercion-resistance and verifiability:
• the voters are required to run a multi-party protocol with registrars in order to
construct their credentials.
• to avoid coercion, the voters must be capable of creating and passing off fake
credentials and fake proofs.
• a trusted registrar and an untappable channel for that registrar are necessary.
Helios voting system, however, is highly usable but it has very weak methods to resist
coercion. For example, in some variants of Helios (and also in the Estonian system), only
the last vote counts. This is supposed to help a voter resist coercion by re-voting. However,
if the voting credentials have been leaked, an attacker can always override a legitimate
vote.
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Moreover, in any e-voting system, there may be cases where the voter is subject to silent
coercion, which means being coerced without noticing. This can happen when the voting
credentials are leaked for various reasons: dishonest registrars, insecure communication
channels, malware on the voting platform. In that case, the voter can be subject to an
impersonation attack and the intended vote may be replaced by a vote chosen by the
attacker. This is a more general form of coercion which is not addressed even in a strong
system like JCJ/Civitas, because there is no way for the voter to find out that the voting
credentials have been compromised. Some variants of JCJ/Civitas [CH11, AFT10, AT13]
aim to improve the usability of voter strategies for achieving coercion-resistance, but they
do not consider the problem of silent coercion explicitly. In Helios as well, if the credentials
of a voter have been leaked, they can be used to cast a vote on voter’s behalf.
5.1.2 Coercion-evidence
This chapter takes as its starting point the observation that it has been impossible to
achieve all the requirements simultaneously. Since result verifiability and usability may
be considered “non-negotiable”, we consider a setting in which coercion-resistance may
be relaxed. Nevertheless, to defend against coercion (both explicit coercion and silent
coercion), we propose the property of coercion-evidence. This means that unforgeable
evidence about the degree of coercion that took place is included in the election output.
Authorities, observers and voters can examine this evidence and use it to determine
whether the election result carries a mandate for the winning candidate. Thus, election
authorities can decide to consider the election as valid or not, leading to disincentivisation
of coercion.
In some situations, dishonest voters could try to disrupt the election by faking being
coerced. Since an individual voter can only fake her own coercion, this strategy would be
effective only if the winning margin is low. Although this doesn’t prevent coercion evidence,
it could lower the attractiveness of our system. We will discuss practical mitigations as
well as research perspectives to address this challenge.
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5.1.3 Caveat Coercitor
As an example of a system satisfying coercion-evidence, we propose Caveat Coercitor, an
internet voting scheme intended to be practically deployable. By shifting away from the
conventional wisdom of coercion-resistance in favour of coercion-evidence, it tries to find a
“sweet spot” between security and usability. Coercion-evidence also means that the system
disincentivises coercion. In Caveat Coercitor, the most the coercer can achieve is to cancel
a voter’s vote. This is worst for the attacker than the usual notion of forced abstention
(where an attacker can force a voter to abstain), because the number of such cancelled
votes is revealed as part of the election output. Since the election result will be considered
valid only if those cancelled votes would not have affected it, this means that the coercer
cannot significantly affect the outcome of the election.
Caveat Coercitor borrows some ideas from JCJ/Civitas, in particular the notion of
private and public credentials, but at the same time it is designed such that, unlike
JCJ/Civitas:
• The generation of credentials does not have to be distributed, making it simpler and
more usable.
• The registration phase needs to be secured only with “best effort” confidentiality
of credentials. If this security is broken, coercion may be possible, but it will be
evident. Credentials can be sent by post, SMS or email. Effort should be made to
keep the credentials confidential, but even if this does not succeed the core property
of coercion evidence is not broken.
• This property does not rely on trustworthiness of any registrar, and does not require
untappable channels during registration. We require the channel to be resilient :
voters will receive their credentials, perhaps after multiple attempts.
• Voters can directly verify that their private credential matches the public one on the
bulletin board (voters can be given the randoms used in the encryption). There is
no need for zero-knowledge proofs.
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• The system does not require the use of fake credentials. If a voter is coerced, she can
give away her real credential and vote normally. Coercion will be evident in that
case.
• The system addresses the problem of silent coercion. If a voting credential has been
leaked and misused by an intruder, this will be evident to any external observer.
Our contributions. 1) We introduce the property of coercion-evidence and we propose
a general formal definition (section 5.2). 2) We propose a new internet voting scheme,
Caveat Coercitor, that achieves coercion-evidence (section 5.3). 3) We weaken the trust
assumptions for internet voting and we discuss how coercion-evidence is useful in practice.
We also hint how Caveat Coercitor could be adapted to address the problem of an untrusted
voting platform (section 5.4). 4) We perform a rigorous analysis of the fact that Caveat
Coercitor satisfies coercion-evidence (section 5.5).
5.2 Coercion-evidence
In this section we do not fix the model that is used to specify security protocols. The
definition can be instantiated in any computational or symbolic model. We assume that
the model defines the notion of a run and of a bulletin board for an e-voting system.
As usual, we assume that there is an attacker (or coercer, intruder) that controls the
communication network. When a message is sent to the environment, it is assumed to be
in the control of the attacker.
We assume that each eligible voter V has a unique voting credential sV . There is
a registration phase where the voters can obtain their correct voting credentials. In
other words, we assume a registration protocol that ensures availability and integrity of
voting credentials. We do not assume that this protocol ensures the secrecy of voting
credentials. In particular, the voting credentials of several voters may have been leaked
during registration.
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The voting phase allows a voter with voting credentials s and the intended vote ν to
execute a program V(s, ν), whose definition depends on the protocol. V(s, ν) may allow
a voter to cast one or multiple ballots, abstain or report coercion. We say that a voter
V , with credential sV and intended vote νV , follows the specification of the protocol if its
interaction with the protocol consists in executing V(sV , νV ).
Definition 1 (coerced, dishonest, free voters). Let τ be a run of an electronic voting
system and V be a voter with credential sV who intends to vote νV . We say that the voter
V is:
• coerced (to vote for νC), if
– a ballot with credential sV and vote νC, with νC 6= νV , is present on the bulletin
board in the voting phase
– V follows the specification of the protocol
in the run τ .
• dishonest, if V does not follow the specification of the protocol in the run τ .
• free, if V is not coerced in the run τ
From our definitions, it follows that honest voters always cast a vote for their intended
choice, and they do not cast a vote for a different candidate. If a voter V with voting
credentials sV is coerced (resp. dishonest) in a run τ , we let sV ∈ δc(τ) (resp. sV ∈ δd(τ))
and we will sometimes say that sV is a coerced (resp. dishonest) credential. Thus for a
run τ ,
• δc(τ) is the set of credentials for coerced voters in τ .
• δd(τ) is the set of credentials for dishonest voters in τ .
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The number |δc(τ)| is called the degree of coercion in the run τ .
A coerced voter is one whose credentials have been leaked and misused by an intruder.
This may have happened by explicit coercion or by silent coercion. We assume that an
honest voter would nevertheless obtain the voting credentials and cast a vote normally for
the intended choice. We consider voters to be coerced only if their credentials have been
used to cast a vote for a candidate that is different from their intended choice.
sv,vv sv,vc
Figure 5.1: A voter with credential sV intending to vote νV is coerced to vote νC if a ballot
with credential sV and vote νC with νV 6= νC is present on the BB; and the voter follows
the specification of the protocol.
A dishonest voter can misbehave in arbitrary ways, and appear to be coerced even
when she is not. It is also possible that a voter did not follow the protocol due to a genuine
mistake, but for simplicity we will consider such voters dishonest. Note that a free voter
can also be dishonest.
We consider an equivalence relation on runs, called indistinguishability, that models the
inability of an observer to tell the difference between two runs that differ on some private
data. For two runs τ and τ ′, we denote by τ ∼ τ ′ if they are in the indistinguishability
relation (defined in section 5.5). A run τ is by definition complete if its corresponding
bulletin board contains the outcome of the election.
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Definition 2 (coercion-evidence). An electronic voting system EVS satisfies coercion-
evidence if:
1. Coercion-evidence test: there exists a test ce(_) that takes as input data on the
bulletin board and outputs a number such that, for every complete run τ of EVS, we
have
|δc(τ)| ≤ ce(τ) ≤ |δc(τ)|+ |δd(τ)|
2. Coercer independence: Let V be a voter with credential sV who intends to vote
for νV . Then, for every run τ of EVS where
• the voter V follows the protocol by executing V(sV , νV )
• for every candidate νi, there is a free honest voter Vi that follows the protocol
by executing V(sVi , νi)
there exists a run τ ′, where V does not execute V(sV , νV ) but rather follows the
coercer’s instructions, such that τ ∼ τ ′.
The first part of coercion-evidence requires the existence of a test that can be applied
to data that is available on the bulletin board in order to determine the degree of coercion
in a given run. Note however that we do not require the test to return the exact degree of
coercion, but allow for an over-approximation. Indeed, for an external party, there is no
way of telling the difference between a coerced voter and a dishonest voter who simulates
being coerced. That is why we have to allow an upper bound of |δc(τ)|+ |δd(τ)|.
The second part of coercion-evidence requires that the coercer can not make a distinction
between a run τ where the voter has followed the protocol normally and has cast a vote
for the desired candidate, in spite of being coerced, and a run τ ′ where the voter has
followed the coercer’s instructions. So a voting system may require that for each coerced
voter there exists a free honest voter, so that in each case there is at least one vote for the
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coerced choice, otherwise the coercer would trivially detect that the coerced voter did not
obey the instructions.
Note that our definition also counters vote buying and achieves effective receipt-freeness.
A receipt for a ballot with valid credentials and a certain candidate, even if that ballot is
cast, is not useful to a coercer because it does not guarantee that the vote will be counted.
One might imagine a system that allows voters to declare that they are being coerced,
perhaps with a tick-box on the ballot form, or a separate channel by which to report
coercion later.
X Help, I’m being coerced!
Figure 5.2: Straw-man proposal for coercion evidence
This may work if voters know they are being coerced. But such a system does not
satisfy coercion-evidence according to our definition, since our definition requires evidence
even in the case of silent coercion.
5.3 Caveat Coercitor
Caveat Coercitor is inspired from JCJ/Civitas [JCJ05, CCM08]. JCJ/Civitas is described
in Chapter 2 in Section 2.3.1.1, here we describe how Caveat Coercitor deviates from it.
5.3.1 Caveat Coercitor: registration, voting and mixing
Caveat Coercitor follows the same scheme as JCJ/Civitas (c.f. Chapter 2 in Section 2.3.1.1).
It has a set R of registrars, set T of tellers, set V1, . . . , Vn of eligible voters, a re-encryption
mix net Mix, and a bulletin board BB. Here we describe it and point out how it deviates
from JCJ/Civitas.
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Trust assumptions: We assume that one mix server in Mix, one teller in T and the voting
platforms are honest. However, to achieve coercion-evidence, Caveat Coercitor does not
have to assume that any of the registrars are trusted, and neither does it require any
untappable channel between voters and registrars. The registration channel is assumed
only to allow the voters to obtain their credentials, and it may allow the coercer to read
honest messages and inject fake messages. We discuss our trust assumptions in more detail
in section 5.4.
Initialisation: The initialisation phase and the structure of the voting ballots are exactly
the same as in JCJ/Civitas. The tellers T have the public key pkT and private key skT . For
a given private credential s, the corresponding public credential enc(s; pkT ; r) is published
on the electoral roll (r is a fresh random number in Z∗q).
Registration: The voters can simply receive their private credentials s by email or by
post. Their creation does not have to be distributed (Recall in JCJ/Civitas, voter V
runs a separate protocol with each of the registrars and obtains a private share siV . The
private voting credential, in JCJ/Civitas, is the sum of all private credential shares, i.e.
sV = s
1
V + . . .+ s
m
V ).
Validity of voter credentials: Because the voter is not required to keep the private credential
secret at all cost, the proofs that the public part enc(s; pkT ; r) of the credential is a correct
encryption of the private part s can be significantly simplified. In fact, the voter can simply
obtain from the registrar the random number r that has been used in the encryption
algorithm. Then, the voter can use any platform to verify that the encryption has been
correctly performed.
Resisting coercion: In Caveat Coercitor voters do not have to “resist” coercion. To make
coercion “evident” a voter does not need to perform any additional task other than to cast
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a vote for the desired candidate. She can give away the voting credential to the coercer, if
asked.
Voting: The construction of voting ballots is similar to the one used in JCJ/Civitas. The
ballot (enc(sV ; pkT ; rs), enc(ν; pkT ; rν),Psν ,Pcorr), from the voter V , contains the encryption
of the private credential sV , the encryption of the intended vote ν, and zero-knowledge
proofs Psν and Pcorr as used in JCJ/Civitas (recall that the zero-knowledge proof Psν proves
that its creator knows both sV and ν, and zero-knowledge proof Pcorr proves that ν is a
valid vote, according to the specification decided by election authorities.). The fundamental
difference in this phase as compared to in JCJ/Civitas is how Caveat Coercitor handles
multiple ballots from the same voter: a voter may submit multiple ballots, constructed on
possibly different voting devices, provided they are all for the same candidate. At most
one vote for one candidate will be counted for each credential. Precisely one vote will be
counted if all the ballots for a given credential contain a vote for the same candidate. No
votes will be counted for a credential if there are ballots for that credential correspond-
ing to at least two distinct candidates. Instead, that credential will be detected by the
coercion-evidence test.
Verification of proofs and mixing: The zero-knowledge proofs of cast ballots are
verified and the ballots with invalid proofs are eliminated. The valid ballots (without
the proofs) and the electoral roll are then sent to the re-encryption mix net Mix for
anonymization.
5.3.2 Caveat Coercitor: coercion-evidence and tallying
We have at this stage a set of anonymized ballots to be tallied and an anonymized electoral
roll. In addition to eliminating ballots with fake credentials, now we need to determine
the coerced credentials, remove the corresponding ballots from the ballots to be tallied
and output evidence of coercion.
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Coercion-evidence: Let τ be a run of Caveat Coercitor up to this phase. We let
• BBaer(τ) be the anonymized electoral roll with each element of the form enc(s; pkT ; r),
for some private credential s. enc(s; pkT ; r) are re-encryptions of public credentials
and we sometimes denote them by es.
• BBcast(τ) be the set of cast ballots with valid zero-knowledge proofs of correctness.
Each element of BBcast(τ) is of the form (enc(s; pkT ; r1), enc(ν; pkT ; r1′),Psν ,Pcorr),
for some private credential s and vote ν. The encrypted votes are sometimes denoted
by eν.
• BBtally(τ) be the set of anonymized ballots to be authorized relying on BBaer(τ) and
then tallied. Each element ofBBtally(τ) is of the form (enc(s; pkT ; r2), enc(v; pkT ; r2′)),
for some private credential s and vote ν.
The tellers will execute an algorithm whose output can be used by any external observer
to determine the amount of coercion, while at the same time allowing coercer-independence.
Specifically, the tellers will compute the set of credentials in BBaer(τ) for which there are
at least two ballots with two different votes in BBtally(τ), i.e. the set
BBce(τ) = {es ∈ BBaer(τ)| ∃(es1, eν1), (es2, eν2) ∈ BBtally(τ).
pet(es, es1) = pet(es, es2) = ok, pet(eν1, eν2) 6= ok}
There is a simple way to compute BBce(τ), shown in Algorithm 1.
The idea is to first group together all the ballots that correspond to a given credential,
relying on plaintext equivalence tests, and then detect if among these there are two ballots
representing distinct votes. At the end of algorithm 1, the set cecredcc (τ) should be equal
to BBce(τ) (we will prove this in section 5.5) and the zero-knowledge proofs in cezkpcc (τ)
should allow anyone to verify that the set cecredcc (τ) has been correctly computed.
Now, the coercion-evidence test cecc(τ) in Caveat Coercitor, described in Algorithm
2, consists in verifying that cccredce (τ) has been correctly computed (basically, this means
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Algorithm 1 Coercion-evidence: algorithm that reveals too much
Input: BBaer(τ), BBtally(τ) (taken from the bulletin board)
Output: cecredcc (τ), cezkpcc (τ)
cecredcc (τ) := ∅; cezkpcc (τ) := ∅
for es ∈ BBaer(τ) do
Bes := ∅ // Bes is the set of ballots corresponding to es
for (es′, eν) ∈ BBtally(τ) do
if pet(es, es′) = ok then
Bes := Bes ∪ {(es′, eν)}
cezkpcc (τ) := ce
zkp
cc (τ) ∪ petproof(es, es′, yes)
for (es1, eν1) ∈ Bes, (es2, eν2) ∈ Bes do
if pet(eν1, eν2) 6= ok then
cecredcc (τ) := ce
cred
cc (τ) ∪ {es}
cezkpcc (τ) := ce
zkp
cc (τ) ∪ petproof(eν1, eν2, no)
return cecredcc (τ), cezkpcc (τ) (to the bulletin board)
verifying the zero-knowledge proofs for the plaintext equivalence tests) and outputting
|cccredce (τ)| as the observed degree of coercion.
Algorithm 2 Coercion-evidence test
Input: cecredcc (τ), cezkpcc (τ) (taken from the bulletin board)
Output: |cecc(τ)|
for zkp ∈ cezkpcc (τ) do
if verify (zkp) 6= ok then
fail
cecc(τ) := count(ce
cred
cc (τ))
return cecc(τ) (to the bulletin board)
The algorithm 1 provides data for the coercion-evidence test and allows coercer
independence, but let us see at what cost coercer independence is achieved. Indeed, note
that the number of ballots that correspond to every credential in BBaer(τ) is revealed. Now,
assume the following coercion strategy: the coercer instructs the voter V to abstain and
then casts a very large number nV of ballots using sV . Therefore, if the voter disobeyed and
has cast a vote using sV , the output of the algorithm 1 will allow the coercer to observe that
for some credential nV + 1 ballots have been cast. Now, to obtain coercer-independence,
there should be some free voter V ′ that has cast nV ballots using s′V : the coercer will see
nV ballots for some credential, and will not be able to tell whether that credential is sV or
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not.
Although in theory coercer independence can be achieved in this way, the practical
aspect of this approach is questionable. Therefore, we propose another algorithm to com-
pute BBce(τ), which outputs less information about the set of tallied ballots (Algorithm
3). Instead of computing the set of all ballots that have been cast with every credential
sV , we carefully guide the computation to determine if there are two distinct votes for sV .
In particular, if there are multiple ballots with credential sV for the same candidate, only
one of them will be determined. We do the minimal amount of computations required to
determine if a credential is coerced or not, and then go to the next credential.
Algorithm 3 Coercion-evidence: algorithm that reveals enough
Input: BBaer(τ), BBtally(τ), can1 . . . canl
(taken from the bulletin board)
Output: cecredcc (τ), cezkpcc (τ)
cecredcc (τ) := ∅; cezkpcc (τ) := ∅
// Step 1: group ballots according to the vote that they encode
for i := 1 to l do
Bi := ∅
for (es, eν) ∈ BBtally(τ) do
if pet(cani, eν) = ok then
Bi := Bi ∪ {(es, eν)}
cezkpcc (τ) := ce
zkp
cc (τ) ∪ petproof(cani, eν, yes)
// Step 2: for each es, check if it occurs in Bi,Bj , i 6= j
for es ∈ BBaer(τ) (***) do
for i := 1 to l do
for (es1, eν1) ∈ Bi do
if pet(es, es1) = ok then
cezkpcc (τ) := ce
zkp
cc (τ) ∪ petproof(es, es1, yes)
for j := i+ 1 to l do
for (es2, eν2) ∈ Bj do
if pet(es, es2) = ok then
cecredcc (τ) := ce
cred
cc (τ) ∪ {es}
cezkpcc (τ) := ce
zkp
cc (τ) ∪ petproof(es, es2, yes)
go to next credential in BBaer(τ) at (***)
return cecredcc (τ), cezkpcc (τ) (to the bulletin board)
We assume there are l candidates and that a list can1, . . . , canl of candidate names
encrypted with pkT has been computed and passed through a mixnet. These encrypted
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candidate names are part of the input for Algorithm 3. The algorithm first groups the
ballots according to the candidate that they represent and then for every credential it
checks whether it belongs to at least two groups.
To achieve coercer independence for a voter V in the context of Algorithm 3, all we
need is the presence of a free voter V ′ that can either cast a normal vote or cancel her
ballots by casting two different votes: the coercer can not tell the difference between the
ballots of V and those of V ′. If the coercer has cast a large number of ballots nV with sV
and the voter V has cast a different vote with sV , the free voter V ′ just needs to cast a vote
for the candidate desired by the coercer: there is no way for the coercer to detect that there
are nV +1 ballots with credential sV and that they have been discarded as coercion-evidence.
Tallying: For a ciphertext c and a set of ciphertexts M , we will denote by c ∈pet M the
fact ∃c′ ∈M.pet(c, c′) = ok. Let BBvalid(τ) = BBaer(τ)rBBce(τ) be the set of anonymized
credentials that are not coerced. Now, for every (es, eν) ∈ BBtally(τ),
• either es ∈pet BBvalid(τ). In this case, since es /∈pet BBce(τ), we are certain that all
ballots that correspond to es contain a vote for the same candidate. Only one of
them should be counted.
• or else es ∈pet BBce(τ). In this case, es corresponds to a coerced credential and no
ballot should be counted for es.
• or else es /∈pet BBaer(τ). In this case, es corresponds to a non-eligible credential and
no ballot should be counted for es
Therefore, we have the following simple algorithm for tallying: for all credential
es ∈ BBvalid(τ), find the first ballot (es′, eν) ∈ BBtally(τ) such that pet(es, es′) = ok; then,
decrypt eν.
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5.4 Coercion-evidence in Caveat Coercitor
5.4.1 Trust assumptions
We will show in section 5.5 that coercion-evidence holds in caveat coercitor under the
following trust assumptions:
• The voting platforms of coerced voters and of some free voters are not compromised.
• The registration channel allows voters to obtain their voting credentials, and voters
verify them to ensure that they are correct. In particular, this implies that voters
can cast a valid ballot for their intended choice.
• There is an anonymous channel that allow voters to cast their vote as intended.
• There exists at least one honest mix server Mix
• There exists at least one honest teller T
The trust assumptions about one honest mix server and one honest teller are standard
and probably necessary in any system based on mixnets and on public-key cryptography.
We explain later in this section how Caveat Coercitor may be adapted to relax the first
assumption about the trusted voting platform.
A big novelty of our trust assumptions, in contrast with Helios and JCJ/Civitas, is
that voting credentials need to be secured only with “best effort”. Thus, even if the voting
channel where the voter obtains her credential is compromised, or if the voter is coerced
to reveal the private credential, coercion-evidence still holds. (However, if the security is
insufficient, a lot of coercion will be detected.) This also means we do not have to trust
the registrars to keep the credential secret. More generally, this addresses the problem of
silent coercion discussed in the introduction of this chapter, which is common to Helios,
JCJ/Civitas and the Estonian internet voting system.
Informally, coercion-evidence holds given these trust assumptions because:
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• The coerced voters follow the instruction to cast a vote for their intended candidate.
Since they have access to a trusted voting platform, this ensures that, for all coerced
voters, coercion-evidence is input in the system during the voting phase. It will be
detected later.
• Additionally, a trusted voting platform means that the coercer can not observe that
a voter has cast a ballot, and this is essential for coercer-independence.
• The voter verifies that her ballot has reached the bulletin board and zero-knowledge
proofs for mixnets and plaintext equivalence tests are publicly checked. This ensures
that coercion-evidence that is input in the system during the voting phase is not
lost on the way from the voters to the tellers. The role of zero-knowledge proofs is
also to ensure that coercion-evidence in ballots to be tallied corresponds indeed to
ballots cast in the voting phase, and not introduced in the system during mixing.
• Voters receive and verify that their credentials are valid. This ensures that their
ballots are not discarded before the final tally, and will result either in a counted
vote, or in coercion-evidence.
• The honest mixer and the honest teller will help in achieving coercer-independence:
the honest mixer will ensure that the ballots cast by the coercer or the coerced voter
can not be tracked to determine how they have been handled in the tallying phase;
the honest teller ensures that the ballots are decrypted and plaintext equivalence
tests are performed only as specified by the protocol.
5.4.2 Example
Suppose that events unfold as depicted in Table 5.1. Among 48M voters, about 44M voters
submit ballots with vote for only one candidate, while about 4.2M voters (or their coercers)
submit ballots containing votes for different candidates. Thus, most voters have not been
coerced, and have cast possibly multiple ballots for a single candidate. They account for
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No. of credentials %age of credentials
Total number of eligible cre-
dentials
48,783,530 100%
Number of credentials that
have voted for a single can-
didate
44,539,363 91.3%
Number of credentials that
have voted for at least two
candidates
4,244,167 8.7%
Table 5.1: An example distribution of ballots. A table in this format is output by the
system at the end of the election.
91.3% of voters. The rest 8.7% of voters have cast ballots for different candidates. These
may be voters that have been forced to release their credentials, forced to cast vote to a
candidate but they also managed to cast vote to their intended candidate or they may
simply have decided to submit two ballots for different candidates. So either they were
coerced or they did not follow the specifications of the protocol and thus were dishonest.
The ballots from these 8.7% of voters will all be discarded and 91.3% of the ballots are
taken to determine the outcome. The system counts one vote for the (single) candidate
represented by each of the set of ballots that corresponds to each credential. The margins
by which the winner beats the other candidates can be considered in order to determine
whether the election result should carry.
To understand the reason for this way of counting, let us distinguish the following two
cases:
• If a credential has been used once or more times, but each time to vote for the same
candidate, a vote for that candidate is counted. Indeed, there are three subcases:
– The voter has cast multiple ballots for the same candidate;
– The attacker obtained voter’s credentials and has cast a ballot for the same
candidate as the voter; or
– The voter knowingly abstained and the attacker obtained her credentials and
cast ballots for one candidate.
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The output of the system does not allow any voter, coercer or observer to distinguish
between these sub-cases, but if the voter behaved correctly and cast a ballot (the
third case is eliminated), then her vote is counted.
• If a credential has been used to cast votes for multiple candidates, none of its votes
is counted. The following sub-cases are indistinguishable:
– The voter has cast multiple ballots for several different candidates;
– The voter has cast multiple ballots for one candidate, the attacker obtained her
credentials and has cast a vote for a different candidate;
– The voter and the attacker each have cast votes for several different candidates;
or
– The voter knowingly abstained and the attacker cast votes on her behalf for
multiple different candidates.
In each of these cases, either the voter is dishonest or the voter is coerced. The corres-
ponding votes are therefore not counted and the evidence is recorded for the authorities to
make a decision.
5.4.3 Discussion
Disincentivisation of coercion: As demonstrated, a coercer that wishes to achieve a
particular outcome is faced with a dilemma. Assuming the security of the cryptography,
and assuming that the voter is not dissuaded from casting her own ballot by invalid threats,
the best the coercer can do is try to force a large number of annulled votes. However, the
number of annulled votes he forces will be detected and announced, and an analysis will
be performed to check whether those votes will materially affect the outcome. If not, the
election will be considered a success and the declared outcome will have been shown to be
robust against the degree of coercion attempted.
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Since annulled votes in Caveat Coercitor are evident, they do not have the power that
forced abstentions have in other systems. If the coercer has a strategy of annulling votes
that he believes would be votes for a particular candidate, it won’t work, because the final
results will be interpreted as meaning ‘there was a lot of coercion’ rather than ‘there were
a lot of abstentions’.
Disruption of the election. In the definition of coercion-evidence, we have taken into
account the fact that dishonest voters may pretend to be coerced, and therefore the
coercion-evidence test may overestimate the actual degree of coercion. In some situations,
a set of dishonest voters could rely on this in order to challenge the validity of the election.
Especially when the difference between the winner and the runner-up of the election is
small, a minority of voters would suffice to cause a disruption.
To deter voters from disrupting the election in practice, one option could be making
voluntarily voting for two different candidates an offence. Both technical and administrative
measures should be carefully designed to find an acceptable balance between discouraging
dishonest behaviour and encouraging resistance to coercion.
Another option is to have a probabilistic interpretation of coercion-evidence, depending
on various data that can be gathered about the election (voter intentions, audit logs, etc.).
This approach would allow to separate coercion-evidence into different threads, one of
which would be evidence of actual coercion. More research on this idea is needed.
Individual and universal verifiability: Individuals can verify that their ballot is
present on the bulletin board, and will be counted. If the voter was coerced, their ballot
will be included in the coercion evidence test. Observers can perform universal and
eligibility verification, because the computations of algorithm 3 are publicly verifiable.
Additionally, observers can verify the figures given in the table.
Towards untrusted voting platforms: Although in this chapter we assume, for
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simplicity, that a voter has access to a trusted voting platform, Caveat Coercitor has the
potential to be adapted to provide coercion evidence in the context of untrusted platforms.
For instance, assume a voter has access to n voting platforms and the voter is unsure
which one can be trusted for integrity. That is not a problem for Caveat Coercitor: the
instruction for the voter is to simply cast her vote on any number of available voting
platforms. As long as one out of n platform is not integrity-compromised (the voter does
not need to know which one):
• either the vote will be counted for the preferred candidate;
• or coercion will be recorded.
This deals with integrity. For voting platforms that are privacy-corrupted, the situation
is more difficult. A voter needs to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the voting
platform communicating with the coercer. This may involve using the voting platform
in a Faraday cage, and resetting it or even destroying it afterwards, depending on the
coercer’s power.
Systems like JCJ/Civitas and Helios are not as well adapted to the untrusted platform,
because they are not designed to be as tolerant of coercion as Caveat Coercer. Our system
allows coercion (but makes it evident).
5.5 Caveat Coercitor satisfies coercion-evidence
According to definition 2, we prove that the coercion-evidence test of Caveat Coercitor is
adequate (section 5.5.1) and that Caveat Coercitor allows coercer independence (section
5.5.2). For coercer independence we give proof sketches in this section and complete proofs
in appendix B.
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5.5.1 Coercion-evidence test
If cecc(τ) is the result of applying the coercion-evidence test in Caveat Coercitor for a run
τ , we have to show that |δc(τ)| ≤ cecc(τ) ≤ |δc(τ)|+ |δd(τ)|.
For a credential s and a vote ν, we will denote by B(s, ν) the set of possible ballots
(including the zero-knowledge proofs) with credential s and vote ν. Thus, B(s, ν) is the
set of tuples of the form (enc(s; pkT ; r), enc(ν; pkT ; r′),Psν ,Pcorr), where r, r′ are random
numbers and Psν , Pcorr are the corresponding zero-knowledge proofs for this ballot. We
denote by B0(s, ν) the set of possible ballots with credential s and vote ν, without the
zero-knowledge proofs.
For a run τ of Caveat Coercitor, recall that BBcast(τ) is the set of cast ballots with
valid zero-knowledge proofs and BBtally(τ) is the set of ballots to be tallied in the run τ .
Let us denote by E(τ) the set of private credentials for eligible voters in a run τ . We define
Icast(τ) = {s | ∃ν, ν ′.ν 6= ν ′,B(s, ν) ∩BBcast(τ) 6= ∅
& B(s, ν ′) ∩BBcast(τ) 6= ∅}
Itally(τ) = {s | ∃ν, ν ′.ν 6= ν ′,B0(s, ν) ∩BBtally(τ) 6= ∅
& B0(s, ν ′) ∩BBtally(τ) 6= ∅}
Fcast(τ) = {s | ∃ν.B(s, ν) ∩BBcast(τ) 6= ∅}r E(τ)
Ftally(τ) = {s | ∃ν.B0(s, ν) ∩BBtally(τ) 6= ∅}r E(τ)
In words, Icast(τ) and respectively Itally(τ) represent the set of (inconsistent) credentials
that have at least two corresponding ballots with different votes on the bulletin board in
the voting phase and in the tallying phase respectively. The set Fcast(τ) represents fake
(i.e. invalid) credentials that have been used to cast a vote, while the set Ftally(τ) is formed
of fake credentials that correspond to ballots that are to be tallied.
A first lemma shows that all the coerced credentials are contained in the set Icast(τ)
and that, additionally, the set Icast(τ) may only contain fake or dishonest credentials:
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Lemma 1. For all run τ of Caveat Coercitor, we have
δc(τ) ⊆ Icast(τ) ⊆ δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ) ∪ Fcast(τ)
The proof of the first inclusion relies on the definition of coerced voters and on the
trust assumption that the coerced voters have access to an honest platform to cast their
vote. Thus, at least two different votes are present for each coerced credential on the
bulletin board: one coming from the voter and another one coming from the coercer. The
second inclusion can be shown by a simple case analysis.
Proof. First we prove that δc(τ) ⊆ Icast(τ). Let s ∈ δc(τ) be the credential of coerced voter
V in a run τ . By definition of coerced voters and since by our assumptions V has access
to a trusted voting device, there exist two ballots in BBcast(τ) corresponding to s and two
different votes ν, ν ′: B(s, ν) ∩ BBcast(τ), B(s, ν ′) ∩ BBcast(τ) and ν 6= ν ′. Therefore, we
have s ∈ Icast(τ).
Let us now prove that Icast(τ) ⊆ δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ) ∪ Fcast(τ). Let s ∈ Icast(τ) and assume
that s /∈ Fcast(τ). We show that s ∈ δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ). By definition of Icast(τ), there exist
ν1, . . . , νn, such that n > 1, νi 6= νj and B(s, νi) ∩ BBcast(τ) 6= ∅, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. By
definition of coerced and dishonest voters, we have
• if all ballots that are cast by V belong to B(s, νi), for a unique i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then V
is coerced and s ∈ δc(τ).
• otherwise, either V has cast two different votes or V did not cast a vote, and we
have s ∈ δd(τ).
Hence we can conclude that s ∈ δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ) ∪ Fcast(τ).
Secondly, we show that the set of fake credentials and the set of inconsistent credentials
can not be changed in the mixnet.
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Lemma 2. For all run τ of Caveat Coercitor in which the mixnet proofs are valid, we
have
Itally(τ) = Icast(τ) and Ftally(τ) = Fcast(τ)
The proof is an easy consequence of the fact that verifiable mixnets can not modify
the content of ballots.
Proof. From definitions, we observe that to conclude the lemma it is sufficient to show that
for all credential s and all vote ν, we have |B(s, ν) ∩ BBcast(τ)| = |B0(s, ν) ∩ BBtally(τ)|.
In words, this means that no ballots have been lost or added to the tally during the mixing
phase. This follows immediately from the validity of mixnet proofs.
Another easy observation is that the set BBce(τ), defined in section 5.3.2, has the same
cardinality as the set of inconsistent credentials that are not fake.
Lemma 3. For all run τ of Caveat Coercitor, we have
|BBce(τ)| = |Itally(τ)r Ftally(τ)|
Proof. Let BBprivce (τ) be the set of private credentials that corresponds to the public
credentials in BBce(τ). We note that |BBprivce (τ)| = |BBce(τ)| and therefore it is sufficient
to show that BBprivce (τ) = Itally(τ)r Ftally(τ).
We have s ∈ BBprivce (τ)⇔ ∃es ∈ BBce(τ), es is the public part of s
∃{s}rpk ∈ BBaer(τ) and ({s}r1pk , eν1), ({s}r2pk , eν2) ∈ BBtally(τ) such that pet(eν1, eν2) 6=
ok⇔ s ∈ E(τ) and ∃ν1 6= ν2 such that B0(s, ν1)∩BBtally(τ) 6= ∅ and B0(s, ν2)∩BBtally(τ) 6=
∅ ⇔ s ∈ Itally(τ)r F(τ).
Let cecredcc (τ) be the set of credentials output by the Algorithm 3 for a run τ .
Finally, we show that the coercion-evidence test provided by Caveat Coercitor captures
exactly |BBce(τ)|, i.e. we show that the Algorithm 3 from section 5.3.2 is correct.
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Lemma 4. For all run τ of Caveat Coercitor, we have
cecredcc (τ) = BBce(τ)
To prove this lemma, we show that every credential in BBce(τ) will be detected in
the step 2 of the Algorithm 3 and added to the set ceτcc. Moreover, we observe that every
credential that has been used to cast a vote for a single candidate will not be part of
cecc(τ), and therefore cecc(τ) ⊆ BBce(τ).
Proof. We prove first that BBce(τ) ⊆ cecredcc (τ). If es0 ∈ BBce(τ), then there exist
(es01, eν
0
1), (es
0
2, eν
0
2) ∈ BBtally(τ) such that pet(es0, es01) = pet(es0, es02) = ok, pet(eν01 , eν02) 6=
ok. As pet(eν01 , eν02)) 6= ok there exist cani, canj with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ such that pet(cani, eν01) =
ok and pet(canj, eν02) = ok. After the Step 1 of the Algorithm 3, we have (es01, eν01) ∈ Bi
and (es02, eν02) ∈ Bj. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that i < j and that i, j are
the smallest indices with these properties.
Therefore, during the step 2 of the Algorithm 3, when es0 is considered for the role
of es, (es01, eν01) ∈ Bi and (es02, eν02) ∈ Bj can be considered for the role of (es1, eν1) and
(es2, eν2). Thus, we have es ∈ cecredcc (τ).
To prove the inverse inclusion, consider es ∈ cccredce (τ). This means there exist Bi,Bj such
that there are (es1, eν1) ∈ Bi, (es2, eν2) ∈ Bj and pet(cani, eν1) = ok, pet(canj, eν2) = ok
and pet(es1, es) = ok = pet(es, es2). Therefore, we can conclude es ∈ BBce(τ).
Recall that, by definition, we have cecc(τ) = |cecredcc (τ)|. Putting all the lemmas together,
we obtain the first part of coercion-evidence according to definition 2. Corollary 1 shows
that the output of the coercion-evidence test in Caveat Coercitor is a correct estimate of
the degree of coercion in any run, up to the number of dishonest voters:
Corollary 1. For all run τ of Caveat Coercitor, we have
|δc(τ)| ≤ cecc(τ) ≤ |δc(τ)|+ |δd(τ)|
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Proof. From lemma 1 and lemma 2, we have δc(τ) ⊆ Icast(τ) and Icast(τ) = Itally(τ).
Therefore, we deduce δc(τ) ⊆ Itally(τ). By definition, all credentials in δc(τ) are valid, i.e.
δc(τ) ⊆ E(τ), and thus δc(τ) ∩ Ftally(τ) = ∅. Hence, we obtain δc(τ) ⊆ Itally(τ)r Ftally(τ).
Considering the cardinality of these sets, we obtain |δc(τ)| ≤ |Itally(τ) r Ftally(τ)| =
|BBce(τ)| = |cecredcc (τ)| = cecc(τ), where we have used lemma 3 for the first equality and
lemma 4 for the second equality. This way we get |δc(τ)| ≤ cecc(τ).
From lemma 1, we have Icast(τ) ⊆ δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ) ∪ Fcast(τ). Using lemma 2, we
get Itally(τ) ⊆ δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ) ∪ Ftally(τ). Subtracting Ftally(τ) from both sides, we have
Itally(τ)r Ftally(τ) ⊆ δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ)r Ftally(τ). Furthermore, by definition we have δc(τ) ∪
δd(τ) ⊆ E(τ) and therefore δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ) r Ftally(τ) = δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ). Thus, we have
Itally(τ)r Ftally(τ) ⊆ δc(τ) ∪ δd(τ). Considering the cardinality of these sets and applying
lemma 3 and lemma 4, we deduce cecc(τ) ≤ |δc(τ)| + |δd(τ)| and we can conclude the
proof.
5.5.2 Coercer independence
Let V be a voter with credential sV who intends to vote for νV . We have to show that, for
every run τ of Caveat Coercitor where
• the voter V follows the protocol by executing V(sV , νV )
• for every candidate νi, there is a free honest voter Vi that follows the protocol by
executing V(sVi , νi)
there exists a run τ ′, where V does not execute V(sV , νV ), such that τ ∼ τ ′.
First we show how τ ′ can be constructed given τ and then we show that τ ∼ τ ′.
A run τ can be characterized by the sequence of messages that have been sent over the
network in τ . For every message in a run τ , either the message is sent by the attacker (or
by a party under the control of the attacker), or else it is sent by an honest agent, and all
the attacker can do is to learn that message. A run τ can be seen as a sequence of (partial)
runs τ = τ1 . . . τn. In Caveat Coercitor, we split a run in a sequence corresponding to the
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phases of the system: τ = τvote.τer.τmix.τtally, where τvote is the list of ballots with valid
zero-knowledge proofs that are cast on the bulletin board in the voting phase, τer is the
electoral roll, τmix is the output of the re-encryption mix net and τtally is the output that
tellers compute in the tallying phase, which includes data for the coercion-evidence test
and the final outcome
Construction of the run τ ′. There are four possible cases for the run τ :
• the coercer cast a vote with credential sV for a candidate νC, with νC 6= νV
• the coercer did not cast a vote with credential sV
• the coercer cast a vote with credential sV for the candidate νV
• the coercer cast at least two different votes with credential sV
For simplicity, we only consider the first case, which is also the most likely. The other
three cases can be handled in a similar way. We sketch the main ideas of the construction
in the following and we give a complete description in the appendix.
Assume the coercer has cast a ballot bsV ,νC ∈ B(sV , νC). By definition of the run τ , we
know that the voter V has cast a ballot bsV ,νV ∈ B(sV , νV ) and that there is a free honest
voter V ′ that has cast a ballot bsV ′ ,νC ∈ B(sV ′ , νC). Thus, the ballots corresponding to sV
are cancelled because they are counted as coercion-evidence, while there is a vote counted
for νC that corresponds to sV ′ .
On the other hand, a requirement of the definition is that the voter V obeys coercer
in the run τ ′. In our case this means that the voter V abstains from voting in the run
τ ′. Therefore, a vote for νC corresponding to sV is counted in the final tally. In order to
obtain τ ∼ τ ′, we need at least to have the same outcome in the runs τ and τ ′. Hence,
we need the free voter V ′ to cancel her vote in the run τ ′: we assume V ′ casts a ballot
bsV ′ ,νC ∈ B(sV ′ , νC), as in the run τ , and in addition a ballot bsV ′ ,νV ∈ B(sV ′ , νV ). The rest
of the cast ballots in τ ′ are assumed to be exactly the same as in τ .
Thus, the amount of coercion-evidence and the final outcome of τ ′ are exactly the same
as in τ . What we need in addition in order to achieve coercer independence is that:
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• the coercer is not able to trace any of the cast ballots and detect that they where
handled as coercion evidence
• the coercer is not able to decrypt the ballots before they are mixed
The first point is achieved by our trust assumptions that the voter V can cast her ballot
on an anonymous channel and that at least one mix server is honest. The anonymous
channel ensures that the coercer can not distinguish the two runs during the voting phase.
Later, in the run τ ′, the honest mix server will permute the ballots so that coercion-evidence
and the votes for νC show up in the same places as in τ . The second point is achieved
by out trust assumption that at least one teller is honest. Therefore, the ballots will be
decrypted only as specified by the protocol, after the mixing occurs.
In conclusion, if τ = τvote.τer.τmix.τtally, then we let τ ′ = τ ′vote.τ ′er.τ ′mix.τ ′tally, where
• τ ′vote is as τvote, with the difference that the voter V abstains from voting and the
free voter V ′ cancels her vote.
• τ ′er = τer
• τ ′mix is as τmix, with the difference that the honest mixer swaps some ballots corres-
ponding to sV with some ballots corresponding to sV ′ , and also swaps the credentials
of V and of V ′ while anonymizing the electoral roll.
• τ ′tally = τtally. This is possible because, by construction of the runs τvote and τ ′vote, it
is the case that they determine the same outcome. Since there is one teller that is
not under the control of the coercer, all the coercer can do is to observe the final
outcome computed according to the specification of the protocol.
Indistinguishability of τ and τ ′. Although the actions performed and observed
by the coercer are the same in τ and in τ ′, it may be the case that the coercer could
distinguish τ from τ ′ by performing various computations on the messages that where
sent in τ and τ ′: encryption, re-encryption, checking zero-knowledge proofs, combining
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messages, etc. In order to reason about the knowledge of the attacker, we therefore need a
formal model of messages and of all possible computations that an attacker may perform.
We adopt a variant of the applied pi-calculus [AF01], used by the protocol verifier ProVerif
[Bla04, BAF08].
We specify for ProVerif the messages that can be built in Caveat Coercitor, the
cryptographic primitives and the possible actions of the attacker. Then, ProVerif allows
us to verify that all the pairs of runs of a bi-process are in observational equivalence.
Observational equivalence models the indistinguishability relation between runs that we
are interested in: τ ∼ τ ′ if and only if any computations applied to τ and to τ ′ lead to the
same observations. A bi-process is a pair of applied pi-calculus processes (P, P ′), see e.g.
[AF01], that share the same structure and differ only on the messages that they handle.
A bi-process (P, P ′) generates pairs of runs (τ, τ ′), where τ is a run of P , τ ′ is a run of P ′
and τ and τ ′ have been generated by executing the same actions in P and in P ′.
We observe that the runs τ and τ ′ constructed in section 5.5.1 are of the form τ = τ0.τtally
and τ ′ = τ ′0.τtally, i.e. the tally in the two runs is exactly the same. Therefore, in order
to show that τ ∼ τ ′, it is sufficient to show that τ0 ∼ τ ′0, where τ0 = τvote.τer.τmix and
τ ′0 = τ
′
vote.τ
′
er.τ
′
mix. Accordingly, we specify two process Pcc and P′cc such that the bi-process
(Pcc,P
′
cc) generates all the pairs of runs of the form (τvote.τer.τmix) and (τ ′vote.τ ′er.τ ′mix) as
constructed in section 5.5.1. We show with ProVerif that observational equivalence holds
for the given bi-process (Pcc,P′cc) (the ProVerif code is attached in Appendix B and is also
available online 1), and therefore we can conclude the indistinguishability of any pair of
runs (τ, τ ′):
Corollary 2. For any pair of runs (τ, τ ′) of Caveat Coercitor constructed as described in
section 5.5.1, we have τ ∼ τ ′.
From corollary 1 and corollary 2, we can conclude:
Theorem 1. Caveat Coercitor satisfies coercion-evidence under the trust assumptions
from section 5.4.1.
1markryan.eu/research/caveat-coercitor/
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5.6 Comparison with the related work
Caveat Coercitor can readily be compared with other systems that allow internet voting,
such as JCJ/Civitas and Helios.
• JCJ/Civitas makes a strong assumption that there is an untappable channel for
registration. It also assumes that the voter can run a multiparty protocols and
keep real credentials secret all the time. Under these assumptions, it is strongly
resistant to coercion, and is fully verifiable by voters and observers. Several variants
of JCJ/Civitas improve the usability of the aspects related to verifiability [BGR11,
SHKS11] and coercion-resistance [CH11].
On the other hard, Caveat Coercitor makes more realistic assumptions about the
voter’s computation environment. It may be broken by the attacker, and if so, the
attacker can get hold of voters credentials. However, coercion-evidence in Caveat Co-
ercitor is not dependent on the secrecy of voting credentials, leading to more realistic
assumption about the distribution of credentials. The registration phase, the voting
phase and the resistance to coercion become simpler and more usable. For example,
credentials can even be sent to voters by post. If credentials are leaked by anyone, e.g.
registrars, postman or computer, coercion evidence will still be recorded. A limited
form of coercion can take place, namely, the voter’s real vote can be cancelled by a
coercer (neither of their votes will be counted). If this happens, it cannot be hidden
by the election authorities. Anyone can check if such coercion would make a material
difference to the outcome. Caveat Coercitor inherits the same high degree of verifiab-
ility as JCJ/Civitas (that is, individual, universal and eligibility verifiability all hold).
• Helios, as explained earlier, is designed for low-coercion elections. Recall that, this
system makes a few efforts to resist potential coercion, for example by keeping secret
from voters the randoms in their ballots, but these efforts are easily defeated. The
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most interesting feature of Helios is its high usability. Caveat Coercitor is designed to
be as usable as Helios (indeed, it can have the same front end and voter experience).
Moreover, Caveat Coercitor does not have the restriction to low-coercion elections
of Helios. Although a weak form of coercion is possible in Caveat Coercitor, the
incentive to coerce a voter is curtailed by two facts: the coercer can only achieve an
annulled vote; and all attempted coercion is publicly verifiable by observers. Any
observer can check if the actual coercion could have made a difference to the election
outcome.
5.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we proposed replacing the requirement of coercion-resistance with a
new requirement of coercion-evidence to simplify the user’s interaction with the voting
systems. We also proposed Caveat Coercitor, an internet voting system to show how
coercion-evidence could be achieved. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to propose an internet voting system with incoercibility properties that does not rely on
an untappable channel. It is also the first work to realise the importance of considering
“silent” coercion (coercion unknown to the voter being coerced, for example by leaked
credentials) together with coercion that is known to the voter. Internet voting system
like Helios that provide high level of usability to the voters could potentially be adapted
to provide coercion-evidence. It would also be interesting to explore how the concept of
coercion evidence could be applied in other contexts than E-voting. For example, it might
be possible to detect malicious behaviour in Bitcoin and other electronic currencies using
techniques similar to coercion-evidence.
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CHAPTER 6
Discussion, further work, and conclusion
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6.1 Discussion
In Chapter 1 section 1.2 we stated objectives of this thesis. Here we discuss what we have
achieved with respect to those objectives.
Objective 1: Improve verifiability and privacy in the presence of untrusted
computers.
Decades of research have concentrated on securing the back end of voting systems,
while assuming that the front end—the voter’s computer—is trusted. Unfortunately,
the computers used by the voters to cast their votes are usually untrustworthy. So in
Chapter 3, we set out to design a voting system, called Du-Vote, that would distribute
trust between a voter’s computer and a minimal token that could be made trustworthy.
We eschewed designs that would have required tokens to have cameras, GUIs, or general-
purpose operating systems. One of the challenge we consequently encountered was how to
minimize the amount of information a human would have to convey between the token
and computer. Typing short codes presented an attractive tradeoff between security and
usability. We mentioned that such hardware tokens are standard in internet banking.
However, the way we use these token in internet voting is novel. Moreover, we improve on
the usage in banking in two ways: [a] the tokens provide a privacy-preserving (as well as
integrity-preserving) channel; [b] we do not require the assumption that the tokens are
trustworthy—we even permit the adversary to manufacture them.
Objective 2: Improve individual verifiability for voters.
In Chapter 4, we argued that the way individual verifiability is achieved in electronic
voting is not intuitive and some voters are not convinced by the security guarantees
provided by the cryptography (e.g. zero-knowledge proofs). So we proposed the use of
trial votes to allow voters to cast votes and audit them at different stages of the election
process. To show how this can be achieved we proposed several additions to JCJ/Civitas
that improve its individual verifiability. We introduced trial credentials that offer to voters
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the ability to audit the election process at any stage: creation of ballots, their transmission
to the bulletin board, their processing by the mixnet and their final decryption. Moreover,
we observed that we can rely on the presence of fake ballots and trial ballots on the bulletin
board after the mix to decrypt all ballots without compromising coercion-resistance. This
certainly improves individual verifiability: to our knowledge, this is the first mixnet based
system where a voter can directly verify that her actual vote is correctly recorded in the
system after the mix. Not only that, but she can also cast as many votes as she likes with
fake credentials and check that they are all correctly output after the mix.
Objective 3: Improve usability by relaxing coercion-resistance.
We argued in the introduction of this thesis and in chapter 5 as well that the balance
between coercion-resistance, election verifiability and, usability remains unresolved in
internet voting despite significant research over the last few years. Therefore, we proposed
coercion-evidence – a new property for e-voting systems that can replace coercion-resistance
and improve usability of electronic voting systems. Our formal definition of coercion-
evidence is general enough to permit the verification of coercion-evidence in various systems
and different security models. To show how coercion-evidence can actually be achieved in
practice and to show how it improves usability we proposed Caveat Coercitor – a voting
system in which coercion is only weakly resisted, but made evident. The ability of a
coercer in this system is limited, because the best the coercer can achieve is the annulment
of a voter’s vote. A major feature of the system (due to coercion-evidence) is that the
degree of coercion that actually took place is publicly verifiable, provided the coerced
voters follow the instructions of the protocol and cast votes for their desired candidate.
This means that the coercer has only little incentive to coerce. Any observer can check
if the coercion (that is, the annulled votes) could have made a material difference to the
outcome.
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6.2 Further work
In this section we will discuss possible further research work and identify open questions
that have emerged from this thesis.
6.2.1 Could we integrate the schemes presented in this thesis?
Integrating Du-Vote and Trivitas: If we integrate Du-Vote and Trivitas then a
voter will need to acquire both the hardware token and the credentials from the election
authorities. She would receive her token by post, and then run a separate JCJ/Civitas
like protocol to get her credentials (both real and trial) from distributed registration
tellers. Then she will interact with her voting platform to generate a code page and follow
instructions similar to the ones in Du-Vote (Chapter 3 Fig 3.4). Once the code for the
desired candidate is chosen the voter will submit it to the server along her trial or real
credentials depending on whether she wants to cast her real or trial vote. Theoretically an
integration of these systems would be possible but the integrated system will be highly
unusable. The amount of work that voters will have to do will be very tedious. Moreover,
due to the presence of an untrusted machine the system will not satisfy coercion-resistance
property. Therefore we do not recommend this integration.
Integrating Du-Vote and Caveat Coercitor: If we integrate Du-Vote and Caveat
Coercitor then a voter would receive both the hardware token and credentials by post
(perhaps in two different posts). At the time of voting, the voter will use the voting
platform to generate the code page and follow her instructions to cast her vote. While
submitting her vote to the server, she submits her credentials as well. This setup would
make the final integrated system coercion-evident, provide eligibility verifiability, and
work on untrusted platform without voters seeking multiple devices. As compared to the
individual systems, the integrated system will be reasonably usable as well.
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Integrating Caveat Coercitor and Trivitas: Integrating Caveat Coercitor and
Trivitas would be quite straightforward as both systems are based on JCJ/Civitas. Voters
in the integrated system will need to acquire their credentials from the distributed re-
gistration tellers. This is needed to maintain the indistingushability of trial and real
credentials. From usability point of view, voters will have the same level of usability as
in Trivitas. However, the requirement of an untappable channel, distributed credential
distribution, and voters needing to keep their credentials secret makes this integrated
system less appealing.
It should be noted that more research will be needed before trying to integrate any
of the above mentioned systems as these analysis are informal. More careful and formal
analysis will be required to verify the properties satisfied by these systems.
6.2.2 Usability studies
In this thesis, with our contributions in Chapter 3-5 we briefly described how a voter will
interact with each system and we argued how it would be better than the existing voting
systems. In the future we would like to conduct usability studies to identify user behaviour
while interacting with these systems. That will give us more detailed view about the user
behaviour and help us gather requirements to improve the user experience even further.
We would also like to test different user interfaces for the systems presented in this thesis.
6.2.3 Towards digital democracy
The main focus of this thesis was about internet voting. However, the techniques presen-
ted can also enable direct participation in the democratic process, without relying on
representatives. This would enable the next version of our democracy where citizens will
be fully involved in the proposal, development and creation of laws. If well-designed and
implemented mechanisms for internet voting and digital democracy are built, then that
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would greatly increase societal inclusiveness and cohesion, as well as lowering the costs of
making democracy work.
6.3 Concluding remarks
We discussed some of the practical problems that any deployable internet voting system
would face. We identified three main issues: (a) computers used by the voters are untrusted
(b) the security guarantees provided by cryptography are not intuitive and (c) coercion-
resistance and verifiability can’t be achieved along with usability. We went on to propose
solutions for these problems that in the future will help overcome the above mentioned
problems. The Digital Democracy Commission in the UK has recommended that the
election should include internet voting in the year 2020. With the solutions proposed
in this thesis we believe that we have taken secure internet voting a step towards being
possible in the future.
Appendices
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APPENDIX A
Appendices related to Chapter 3
This appendix contains proofs supporting Chapter 3.
A.1 Proofs used by S to prove its honesty
The server S creates universally-verifiable proofs to show that it correctly selected and
reencrypted the ciphertext that was chosen by the voter. These proofs are posted on BB
to allow anyone to check it. We briefly discussed these proofs in Chapter 3. Here we
provide these proofs with their technical details and the cryptographic primitives that are
required to understand them.
A.1.1 Ring signatures and OR-proofs
Consider a set {P1, . . . , Pn} of participants, and suppose that each participant Pi has a
private key ski and a corresponding public key pki. We suppose Pi possesses his own private
key ski and all of the public keys {pkj}1≤j≤n. A ring signature is a cryptographic signature
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that such a participant Pi can make, and has the property that any verifier in possession
of the public keys {pkj}1≤j≤n can be assured that one of the participants {P1, . . . , Pn}
made the signature, without being able to tell which one it was [AOS02, CLMS08]. In a
ring signature, there is one “actual” signer, in our example Pi; the signing process uses his
secret key ski and the public keys {pkj}1≤j≤n, j 6=i of the other ring members. The actual
signer does not need the permission or involvement of the other ring members.
A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a proof between a prover and a verifier that demon-
strates to the verifier that a certain statement is true, without revealing any information
except the validity of the statement [GMR89]. Non-interactive zero knowledge proofs
(NIZKP) are a variant of ZKP that do not require interaction between the prover and
the verifier. If the statement being proved asserts that the prover knows a secret signing
key, this type of NIZKP can be a signature on some arbitrary value using the signing key,
and is called a signature-based proof of knowledge (SPK). The message being signed is
not important, it can be a constant value or even blank. A Schnorr signature [Sch91] is
commonly used for this purpose.
If the statement being proved asserts that the prover knows a secret value satisfying a
disjunction of properties, then a ring signature can be used. For example, given a finite set
Ω = {x1, . . . , xn}, a group generator g, and a function f , we may prove in zero knowledge
that we know a d such that gd = f(x1) or . . . or gd = f(xn). Such a proof is a ring
signature on an arbitrary value, where the actual signing key is d and the public keys are
{f(x) | x ∈ Ω}. We write such a signature proof of knowledge as
SPK{d | ∃x : x ∈ Ω ∧ gd = f(x)}.
It is useful to generalise this to a double signature. Let Ω be a set of pairs, and g1, g2 be
two group generators, and f1, f2 be two functions. We write
SPK{d | ∃x1, x2 : (x1, x2) ∈ Ω ∧ gd1 = f1(x1) ∧ gd2 = f2(x2)}
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to mean a proof of knowledge of d satisfying gd1 = f1(x1) and gd2 = f2(x2) for some (x1, x2) ∈
Ω. The signer’s private key is d, and the ring of public key pairs is {(f1(x1), f2(x2) |
(x1, x2) ∈ Ω}.
A.1.2 Proof of selection and re-encryption of the voter’s chosen
ciphertext
Using these ideas, we show how the server S produces a zero-knowledge proof that it
correctly computed the voter’s chosen ciphertext x = (x1, x2) from the inputs C∗ and x∗
that S receives from P ; and that it outputs a correct re-encryption of that x, all without
revealing what x is. The proof is divided into three parts.
Proof of selection. S computes a pair D = (D1, D2) = (gd, ydhx2), for some value
d, where x2 is the second component of the voter’s ciphertext; and proves that D is of this
form.
To see how this is achieved, we assume that V ’s coin flip yielded tails, and V enters
B∗1 . . . B
∗
nx
∗ into H, where x∗ ∈ {A∗1 . . . A∗n}. S starts as follows:
• retrieve C = ykh(B∗1 ||...||B∗n||x∗) and publish it. The last κ digits of C is C∗, which can
be checked by everybody.
• compute Cx∗ = C/h(10κB∗1 ||...||B∗n) = ykhx∗ . This value is publicly known as anybody
can compute it from C and (B1, . . . , Bn).
• compute x′ by truncating the last κ digits of x2. Thus, x2 = x′||x∗.
• compute Cx′ = yr′h10κ x′ , and publish it, where r′ is chosen randomly.
• prove knowledge of x′ and r′ in Cx′ . We call this proof Px′ .
• compute D = (D1, D2) = (gd, Cx∗Cx′) = (gd, ydhx2), where d = k + r′; anyone can
compute D2 from Cx∗ and Cx′ .
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These computations demonstrate the relationship between D and C: they show that
D2 = y
dhx2 and C = ykhB∗1 ||...||B∗n||x∗ share the same x∗.
To prove the structure of D, S must prove knowledge of d such that D = (D1, D2) =
(gd, ydhx2), for some x2 ∈ {A1,2, . . . , An,2} (recall that each ElGamal ciphertext Ai is a
pair (Ai,1, Ai,2)). This proof can be written as
PD = SPK{d | ∃x2 ∈ Ω : gd = D1 ∧ ydhx2 = D2},
where Ω = {A1,2, . . . , An,2}. We show that such a proof can be achieved, by writing it
equivalently in the following form to match the shape of ring signature proofs above:
PD = SPK{d | ∃x2 ∈ Ω : (gy)d = D1D2/hx2}.
Proof of re-encryption of a ciphertext. As previously mentioned, the ballot x
can’t directly go to the bulletin board BB, because P knows the plaintext and could later
use BB to see how the voter voted. To address this, S now computes a re-encryption
E = (E1, E2) = (g
ex1, y
ex2) of x (where e is chosen at random).
The proof of the structure of E can be shown using double ring signature:
PE = SPK{e | ∃x1, x2 : (x1, x2) ∈ Ω ∧ ge = E1/x1 ∧ ye = E2/x2},
where Ω = {A1, . . . , An}.
Proof that the re-encryption is of the selected ciphertext. The proof PE
shows that E is the re-encryption of one of the values in {A1, . . . , An}, but not that it
is the one chosen by the voter. To prove that the (x1, x2) used in the computation of E
matches the code chosen by the voter, S has to show that the x2 in E is the same as the x2
in D. To demonstrate this, S computes F = (F1, F2) = (E1D1, E2D2) = (gfx1, yfx2hx2)
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where f = d+ e, and proves that F indeed has this form. The proof that F has the correct
form is another double ring signature:
PF = SPK{f | ∃x1, x2 : (x1, x2) ∈ Ω ∧ gf = F1/x1 ∧ yf = F2/x2hx2}
where Ω = {A1, . . . , An}.
Note that by putting Px′ , PD, PE and PF together, we have actually proved that E is
a re-encryption of Ai = (Ai,1, Ai,2) where Ai,2 = x2 and x∗2 is involved in C∗. The proofs
Px′ , PD, PE and PF are bound together as a single Schnorr signature proof Ptotal. This
proof Ptotal is also posted on the bulletin board BB.
Our constructions are novel, but they make use of the standard signature-based proof
of knowledge (SPK) technique. By using the Fiat-Shamir [FS86] heuristic, we are assured
that the proof is sound and complete, and has the computational zero-knowledge property.
A.2 Proof that the encryption scheme is IND-CPA
Du-Vote requires the platform to find ciphertexts for which, when written in decimal form,
the last κ digits are equal to certain codes. One might be concerned that adding such a
requirement may imply that the encryption scheme is insecure. To alleviate such fears, in
this section we prove that the encryption scheme is IND-CPA.
Definitions. Let Encrypt0 be standard ElGamal, and Encrypt1 be our variant.
Formally, they are defined as follows:
Encrypt0(m , y) = // standard ElGamal
random r;
(c1 , c2) = (gr , m.yr);
output (c1 , c2)
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Encrypt1(m , y , code) = // our variant
new r;
(c1 , c2) = (gr , m.yr);
while c∗2 != code {
(c1 , c2) = (c1.g , c2.y)
}
output (c1 , c2)
Recall that Encrypt0(m, y) satisfies IND-CPA. Thus, we may consider a typical CPA
game between a simulator and an attacker. In such a game, the attacker receives the public
key y from the simulator; the attacker sends a pair of challenge messages (m0,m1) to the
simulator; the simulator chooses a random bit b, encrypts mb and returns the ciphertext;
the attacker outputs b′. If b′ = b, the attacker wins the game.
Assumption. Let m and y be fixed, and i be a randomly chosen q-bit value. Then
(m.yi)∗ is uniformly distributed in the space of κ-digit decimal numbers.
Theorem 2. Under our assumption, Encrypt1(m, y, code) satisfies IND-CPA.
Proof: Suppose Adversary A has a target of breaking Encrypt0(m, y). If there exists
Adversary B who is able to break Encrypt1(m, y, code), then A can use B to break
Encrypt0(m, y).
We set up two games. Game 1 is between a simulator S and the adversary A (playing
as an attacker), and Game 2 is between A (playing as a simulator) and B (playing as an
attacker).
• In Game 1, A gets the ElGamal public key y from S.
• In Game 2, A forwards y to B.
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• In Game 2, A receives a pair of challenge messages (m0,m1) from B.
• In Game 1, A forwards (m0,m1) to S.
• In Game 1, A receives (c1, c2) = (gr,mb · yr), where b ∈ {0, 1}, from S.
– A searches for a value i satisfying (c′1, c′2) = (c1.gi, c2.yi) and c′∗2 = code.
– A terminates the games if such a value doesn’t exist.
• In Game 2, A sends (c′1, c′2) to B.
• In Game 2, B returns b′ to A.
• In Game 1, A returns b′ to S.
If A succeeds in finding the value i, the probability of A winning Game 1 is equal to the
probability of B winning Game 2.
Let us now calculate the probability that A succeeds in finding the value i. For a
given value of r and i, the probability that (m.yr+i)∗ = code is 1/10κ (here we rely on
the assumption). The probability that (m.yr+i)∗ 6= code is, therefore, 1 − 1/10κ. We
have 2|q| possible values of i, so the probability of none of them satisfying the equation
is (1− 1/10κ)2|q| . Therefore the probability that there is at least one i that satisfies the
equation is pi = 1− (1− 1/10κ)2|q|).
The probability that A wins Game 1 is pi times the probability of B winning Game 2.
The value 1− pi is negligible in q, so the theorem follows.
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APPENDIX B
Appendices related to Chapter 5
This appendix contains proofs supporting Chapter 5
B.1 Proof for coercer independence 5.5.2
To prove that Caveat Coercitor satisfies coercer independence, we have to show that for
every run τ of Caveat Coercitor where
• the voter V follows the protocol by executing V(sV , νV )
• for every candidate νi, there is a free honest voter Vi that follows the protocol by
executing V(sVi , νi)
there exists a run τ ′, where V does not execute V(sV , νV ), such that τ ∼ τ ′.
We gave a sketch of the main ideas of the construction of run τ ′ in chapter 5 section
5.5.2. Here we give a complete description.
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Construction of the run τ ′. The main idea in the construction of τ ′ is to rely on the
free voter V ′ in the voting phase so that the ballots of V ′ in the run τ ′ look like the ballots
of voter V in the run τ , and the other way around. Furthermore, we rely on an honest
re-encryption mix server to ensure that the coercer can not track the ballots back to V
or to V ′. The honest mix server swaps the ballots of V and V ′ and also their credentials
in the anonymized electoral roll. An honest tabulation teller ensures that the tallying is
performed according to the specification of the protocol, both in τ and in τ ′.
For a run τ = τvote.τer.τmix.τtally as the one in section 5.5.2, we let τ ′ = τ ′vote.τer.τ ′mix.τ ′tally,
where τ ′vote, τ ′mix and τ ′tally are defined in the following.
Voting phase. We have by definition at least three particular ballots present in τvote
(recall that we consider the case when the coercer has cast a vote for νC, νC 6= νV , using
the credential sV ): two with credential sV and one with credential sV ′ . Without loss of
generality, we fix an order for these three ballots on the bulletin board. Then, we have:
τvote = L1.bsV ,vC .L2.bsV ,vV .L3.bsV ′ ,vC .L4
where bsV ,νC ∈ B(sV , νC), bsV ,νV ∈ B(sV , νV ), bsV ′ ,νC ∈ B(sV ′ , νC) and L1,L2,L3,L4 are
lists of ballots. Furthermore, for any 1 ≤ ` ≤ 4, if there is a ballot in Li that corresponds
to the credential sV ′ , then the corresponding vote is νC.
Let cV and respectively cV ′ be the public credentials that correspond to the private
credentials sV and sV ′ . Then, without loss of generality, we can assume that the electoral
roll is
τer = S1.cV .S2.cV ′ .S3
where S1, S2 and S3 are the public credentials of other voters. Now, for some bsV ′ ,νV ∈
BsV ′ ,νV , let us consider τ ′vote defined as follows
τ ′vote = L1.bsV ,νC .L2.bsV ′ ,νV .L3.bsV ′ ,νC .L4
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Hence, τ ′vote is the same as τvote, with the difference that V now follows the instructions
of the coercer and does not cast a vote for the intended candidate, while the free voter V ′
becomes dishonest, and casts an additional ballot for the candidate intended by V .
Mixing phase. According to our trust assumptions, there is at least one mix server that
is not controlled by the coercer. Let τmix = τ 0mix.τ 1mix.τhmix.τ 2mix, where:
• τ 0mix is the input to the mix network, i.e. τ 0mix = τ 0vote.τer.τcand, where τ 0vote contains the
ballots from τvote, but not their corresponding zero-knowledge proofs, and τcand is a list of
encrypted candidate names (to be used in the coercion-evidence test, cf Algorithm 2).
• τ 1mix is the output of (dishonest) mix servers that are present in the mixnet before the
honest mix server.
• τhmix is the output of the honest mix server.
• τ 2mix is the output of (dishonest) mix servers that are present in the mixnet after the
honest mix server.
Now, we consider τ ′mix = τ ′
0
mix.τ
′1
mix.τ
′h
mix.τ
′2
mix, where:
• τ ′0mix = τ ′0vote.τ ′er.τ ′cand, where τ ′0vote contains the ballots from τ ′vote, but not their
corresponding zero-knowledge proofs„ and τ ′er = τer, τ ′cand = τcand.
• τ ′1mix is constructed from τ ′0mix by applying exactly the same operations as for constructing
τ 1mix from τ 0mix. This possible because these operations consist only in performing re-
encryptions and applying permutations to the set of ballots: they do not depend on the
content of ballots.
• τ ′hmix is constructed as follows. Recall that τ 0mix = τ 0vote.τer.τcand, where τ 0vote is τvote without
the zero-knowledge proofs of correctness, i.e. we have
τ 0vote = L
0
1.b
0
sV ,νC .L
0
2.b
0
sV ,νV
.L03.b
0
s′V ,νC
.L04
where we denote by b0 (resp. L0) a ballot b (resp. a list of ballots L) stripped of its proofs.
Let τ ihmix be the input for the honest mix server in τmix, i.e. the output of the last dishonest
server in τ 1mix. Relying on the zero-knowledge proofs that have to be provided by any
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mix server (including the dishonest ones), we deduce that τ ihmix = ρ1.ρ2.ρ3 where ρ1, ρ2
and respectively ρ3 are re-encryption mixes of τ 0vote, τer and respectively τcand, with some
permutations chosen by the coercer. Thus, we have
ρ1 = L1.w1.L2.w2.L3.w3.L4
ρ2 = S1.t1.S2.t2.S3
where w1.w2.w3 is a re-encryption mix of b0sV ,νC .b
0
sV ,νV
.b0s′V ,νC
and t1.t2 is a re-encryption
mix of cV .cV ′ . Furthermore, τhmix = ρh1 .ρh2 .ρh3 , where, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, ρhi is a re-
encryption mix of ρi, with some permutation chosen by the honest mix server. Let:
ρh1 = L
h
1 .w
h
1 .L
h
2 .w
h
2 .L
h
3 .w
h
3 .L
h
4
ρh2 = S
h
1 .t
h
1 .S
h
2 .t
h
2 .S
h
3
where wh1 .wh2 .wh3 is a re-encryption mix of w1.w2.w3 and th1 .th2 is a re-encryption mix of
t1.t2.
On the other hand, according to our construction of τ ′1mix, the input to the honest mix
server in τ ′mix is τ ′
ih
mix = ρ
′
1.ρ2.ρ3, where
ρ′1 = L1.w
′
1.L2.w
′
2.L3.w
′
3.L4
and w′1.w′2.w′3 is a re-encryption mix of b0sV ,νC .b
0
sV ′ ,νV
.b0sV ′ ,νC such that, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3,
if w′i ∈ B0(sV , νC) or w′i ∈ B0(sV ′ , νC), then w′i = wi. Thus, as in the case of the pair
(τvote, τ
′
vote), the only difference between τ ′
ih
mix and τ ihmix is that, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, we have
w′i ∈ B0(sV ′ , νV ) and wi ∈ B0(sV , νV ).
In the run τ ′ the output of the honest mix server must be τ ′hmix = ρ′1
h.ρ′h2 .ρ
′h
3 , corres-
ponding to re-encryption mixes of ρ′1, ρ2 and ρ3. Relying on the fact that the mix server
producing τ ′hmix is honest, we can choose particular permutations and particular randoms
for the re-encryption mixes that produce τ ′hmix. We choose these such that we have the
following:
B.1 Proof for coercer independence 5.5.2 131
ρ′h1 = L
h
1 .w
′h
1 .L
h
2 .w
′h
2 .L
h
3 .w
′h
3 .L
ρ′h2 = S
h
1 .t
′h
1 .S
h
2 .t
′h
2 .S
h
3
where w′h1 .w′
h
2 .w
′h
3 is a re-encryption mix of w′1.w′2.w′3 and t′
h
1 .t
′h
2 is a re-encryption mix of
t1.t2 such that:
• w′hi ∈ B0(sV ′ , νC)⇔ whi ∈ B0(sV , νC).
• w′hi ∈ B0(sV ′ , νV )⇔ whi ∈ B0(sV , νV )
• w′hi ∈ B0(sV , νC)⇔ whi ∈ B0(sV ′ , νC)
• pet(t′h1 , cV ) = ok⇔ pet(th1 , cV ′) = ok
• pet(t′h2 , cV ′) = ok⇔ pet(th2 , cV ) = ok
Intuitively, the two ballots from V ′ and the ballot from V are re-arranged in the
run τ ′mix by the honest mix server so that the plaintext equivalence tests performed for
coercion-evidence will succeed for the same positions in τ ′ as in τ , and also the vote for vC
is revealed in the same position. Furthermore, the credentials of V and V ′ are swapped on
the electoral roll, so that the credential that is marked as coerced is at the same position
in both runs.
• τ ′2mix is constructed from τ ′hmix by performing exactly the same operations as for
constructing τ 2mix from τmixh. This is possible because the operations performed by a
re-encryption mix server do not depend on the content of ballots.
Tallying phase. Let τ outmix and respectively τ ′
out
mix be the outcome of the re-encryption
mix net after the (partial) runs τvote.τmix and τ ′vote.τ ′mix. Note that τ outmix = τ outvote.τ outer .τ outcand and
τ ′outmix = τ
′out
vote.τ
′out
er .τ
′out
cand, where for all a ∈ {vote, er, out}, τ outa and respectively τ ′outa is a
re-enncryption mix of τa and respectively τ ′a. Furthermore, by construction we have:
• τ outcand = τ ′outcand
• τ outer = t1 . . . tn and τ ′outer = t′1 . . . t′n such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
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– either t′i = ti
– or else pet(t′i, cV ) = ok and pet(ti, cV ′) = ok
– or else pet(t′i, cV ) = ok and pet(ti, cV ′) = ok
• τ outvote = w1 . . . wm and τ ′outvote = w′1 . . . w′m such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
– either w′i = wi
– or else w′i ∈ B0(sV ′ , νC) and wi ∈ B0(sV , νC)
– or else w′i ∈ B0(sV ′ , νV ) and wi ∈ B0(sV , νV )
– or else w′i ∈ B0(sV , νC) and wi ∈ B0(sV ′ , νC)
The trust assumptions for Caveat Coercitor ensure that there is at least one honest
teller. The honest teller will follow the protocol and will not reveal his share of the
decryption key to the coercer. Therefore, the only way to complete any run in the
tallying phase for the coercer is to obey the specification of the protocol. Thus, we have
τtally = τvalid.τbuckets.τ
1
c . . . τ
n
c .τdec, where
• τvalid are the ballots from τ outvote with eligible credentials
• τbuckets is the outcome of plaintext equivalence tests that are performed to group the
ballots according to the vote that they contain (step 1 of algorithm 2)
• for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, τ ic represents the outcome of plaintext equivalence tests
performed to determine if the voter with credential ti is coerced (step 2 of algorithm
2)
• τdec represents the result of decrypting ballots with valid credentials whose corres-
ponding voters have not been coerced or dishonest.
Then, we let τ ′tally = τ ′valid.τ ′buckets.τ ′
1
c . . . τ
′n
c .τ
′
dec, where:
• because sV and sV ′ are valid credentials by assumption, we note that the set of
ballots with ineligible credentials is exactly the same in τ outvote and τ ′
out
vote. Therefore, if
τvalid = τ
out
vote r S, then we can choose τ ′valid = τ ′
out
vote r S.
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• from our observation about (τ outvote, τ ′outvote) and (τ outer , τ ′outer ), it follows that the plaintext
equivalence tests from algorithm 2 and the decryption of the final outcome give
exactly the same results for (τvalid, τ outer ) and (τ ′valid, τ ′
out
er ). Therefore, we can choose
τ ′buckets = τbuckets, τ
′i
c = τ
i
c , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and τ ′dec = τdec.
This way we finish the construction of τ ′.
Indistinguishability of τ and τ ′.
The ProVerif code below (which is also available online at markryan.eu/research/caveat-
coercitor) verifies the observational equivalence of a bi-process (Pcc, P ′cc), which generates
pairs of runs of the form (τ, τ ′), as described in section 5.5.2. Pcc and P ′cc share the same
structure and differ only on some (internal) messages. This difference can be expressed in
ProVerif with the construct choice[u, v]: the process Pcc (also called the left process) uses
the term u, whereas the process P ′cc (the right process) uses the term v. To model the
difference between the runs τ and τ ′ from Caveat Coercitor all we need is to make sure
that the ballots that are cast are as expected. Then, ProVerif explores all the possible
runs starting from that.
(* CANDIDATES *)
fun can1/0. fun can2/0.
(* PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION & RE-ENCRYPTION *)
fun pub/1. fun enc/3. fun dec/2.
fun renc/2. fun f/2.
equation dec(enc(x, pub(y), z), y) = x.
(*equation renc(enc(x,y,z),z’) = enc(x,y,f(z,z’)).*)
(*ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOFS*)
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fun ok/0.
(*PROOF OF VALID DECRYPTION*)
fun decProof/3. fun checkDec/4.
equation checkDec(decProof(enc(x,pub(y),z),x,y),
enc(x,pub(y),z),x, pub(y))=ok.
(*PROOF OF KNOWLEDGE OF PLAINTEXT*)
fun knowsProof/3. fun checkKnows/2.
equation checkKnows(knowsProof(enc(x,y,z),x,z),
enc(x,y,z)) = ok.
(*PROOF THAT THE VOTE IS IN VALID RANGE*)
fun voteProof/3. fun checkVote/2.
equation checkVote(voteProof(enc(can1,y,z),can1,z),
enc(can1,y,z)) = ok.
equation checkVote(voteProof(enc(can2,y,z),can2,z),
enc(can2,y,z)) = ok.
(*CHANNELS*)
free bb_ballots.
free bb_credentials.
(*SECRET KEY OF THE ELECTION*)
private free sk.
(*PRIVATE CREDENTIALS OF VOTERS A AND B*)
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private free priv_a,priv_b.
free credentials.
let Credentials =
(*PUBLIC CREDENTIALS OF VOTER A AND VOTER B*)
new ra; new rb;
let pub_a = enc(priv_a,pub(sk),ra) in
let pub_b = enc(priv_b,pub(sk),rb) in
out(bb_credentials,choice[pub_a,pub_b]);
out(bb_credentials,choice[pub_b,pub_a]);
(*PUBLIC CREDENTIALS OF ANY VOTER*)
in(credentials, priv_c);
new rc;
let pub_c = enc(priv_c,pub(sk),rc) in
out(bb_credentials,pub_c).
(*CANDIDATES*)
free candidates.
let Candidates = ! (out(candidates,can1) | out(candidates, can2)).
(*VOTERS*)
(*THE PROCESS VoterAB AND VoterB REPRESENT SOME BALLOTS THAT SHOULD BE
PRESENT ON THE BULLETIN BOARD ACCORDING TO THE SPECIFICATION OF RUNS TAU
AND TAU’. *)
(*IN THE RUN TAU (THE FIRST COMPONENT OF choice): VOTER A CASTS A VOTE
FOR THE INTENDED CANDIDATE can1 AND VOTER B CASTS A VOTE FOR THE
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CANDIDATE DESIRED BY THE COERCER can2*)
(*IN THE RUN TAU’ (THE SECOND COMPONENT OF choice): VOTER A ABSTAINS
AND THE VOTER B CASTS TWO BALLOTS: ONE FOR can1 AND ONE FOR can2*)
let VoterAB = new r1;new r2;
(*BALLOT FOR THE VOTER A IN THE RUN TAU*)
let enc_voteA = enc(can1,pub(sk),r1) in
let enc_credA = enc(priv_a,pub(sk),r2) in
let knows_proofA = (knowsProof(enc_voteA,can1,r1), knowsProof(enc_credA,
priv_a,r2)) in
let vote_proofA = voteProof(enc_voteA,can1,r1) in
let ballotA = (enc_voteA,enc_credA, knows_proofA, vote_proofA) in
(*BALLOT FOR THE FREE VOTER B IN THE RUN TAU’*)
let enc_voteB = enc(can1,pub(sk),r1) in
let enc_credB = enc(priv_b,pub(sk),r2) in
let knows_proofB = (knowsProof(enc_voteB,can1,r1),
knowsProof(enc_credB, priv_b,r2)) in
let vote_proofB = voteProof(enc_voteB,can1,r1) in
let ballotB = (enc_voteB,enc_credB, knows_proofB, vote_proofB) in
(*OUTPUT OF ballotA IN THE RUN TAU AND OF ballotB IN THE RUN TAU’*)
out(bb_ballots,choice[ballotA,ballotB]).
(*THE PROCESS VoterB REPRESENTS A BALLOT FROM THE FREE VOTER B
FOR THE CANDIDATE can2 DESIRED BY THE COERCER *)
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let VoterB = new r1; new r2;
let enc_vote = enc(can2,pub(sk),r1) in
let enc_cred = enc(priv_b,pub(sk),r2) in
let knows_proof = (knowsProof(enc_vote,can2,r1),
knowsProof(enc_cred, priv_b,r2)) in
let vote_proof = voteProof(enc_vote,can2,r1) in
let ballot = (enc_vote,enc_cred, knows_proof, vote_proof) in
out(bb_ballots,ballot).
let VoterGeneral =
new r1; new r2;
in(candidates,can);
in(credentials,priv_c);
let enc_vote = enc(can,pub(sk),r1) in
let enc_cred = enc(priv_c,pub(sk),r2) in
let knows_proof = (knowsProof(enc_vote,can,r1),
knowsProof(enc_cred, priv_c,r2)) in
let vote_proof = voteProof(enc_vote,can,r1) in
let ballot = (enc_vote,enc_cred, knows_proof, vote_proof) in
out(bb_ballots,ballot).
let BallotsToMixnet = ! ( in(bb_ballots,(x,y,z,w)); out(bb_ballots,(x,y)) ).
let Mixnet = BallotsToMixnet | !MixBallots | !MixCredentials.
let MixBallots = in(bb_ballots,(x,y));
let vote = dec(x,sk) in
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let cred = dec(y,sk) in
new rx;new ry;
let newx = enc(vote, pub(sk),rx) in
let newy = enc(cred, pub(sk),ry) in
out(bb_ballots, (newx,newy)).
let MixCredentials =
in(bb_credentials,x);
let cred = dec(x,sk) in
new rx;
let newx = enc(cred, pub(sk),rx) in
out(bb_credentials, newx).
free roc.
let ReencryptionOracle =
in(roc,ciph);
let plain = dec(ciph,sk) in
new random;
let renc_ciph = enc(plain,pub(sk),random) in
out(roc,renc_ciph).
process
out(bb,priv_a); (*** THE VOTER A IS COERCED: HIS CREDENTIAL
IS KNOWN TO THE ATTACKER ***)
out(bb,pub(sk)); Candidates | Credentials | VoterAB
| VoterB | VoterGeneral | Mixnet | ReencryptionOracle
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